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The Protection of Freedom of
Expression from Social Media
Platforms
András Koltay*
I. INTRODUCTION
Social media platforms have overturned the previously known
system of public communication. As predicted at the outset, the spread
of the public Internet that started three decades ago has resulted in a
paradigm shift in this field. Now, anyone can publish their opinion
outside the legacy media, at no significant cost, and can become known
and be discussed by others. Due to the technological characteristics of
the Internet, it might also be expected that this kind of mass
expression, with such an abundance of content, would necessitate the
emergence of gatekeepers, similar in function to the ones that existed
earlier for conventional media. The newsagent, post office, and cable or
satellite services have been replaced by the Internet service provider,
the server (host) provider and the like. However, no one could have
foreseen that the new gatekeepers of online communication would not
only be neutral transmitters or repositories but also active shapers of
the communication process, deciding on which user content on the
Internet they deemed undesirable and deciding which content, out of all
the theoretically accessible content, is actually displayed to individual
users. Content filtering, deleting, blocking, suspending, and ranking are
Professor of Law, University of Public Service (Budapest) and Pázmány Péter Catholic
University (Budapest). I would like to thank the valuable comments, suggestions and
support of RonNell Andersen Jones, Jon Garon, Margaret Hu, Seth Oranburg, Sue
Painter-Thorne, Eric J. Segall, Gary Simson, and Russell L. Weaver, participants of the
Symposium of the Mercer Law Review on October 8, 2021. Thanks are also due to the
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(organized at the University of Texas at Austin), especially to the generous discussant of
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all types of active interference with the exercise of users’ freedom of
speech and practices which also affect the interests of other users in
obtaining information. All this became an even greater and more
difficult-to-manage issue when, in certain sub-markets of the Internet,
certain giant tech companies’ services gained a monopoly or came close
to doing so. This process has emerged in connection with gatekeepers of
a specific type: the most important online platforms (social media, video
sharing, search engines, web stores). In this way, a new, unexpected
obstacle to the exercise of freedom of speech appeared, with the result
that the earlier constitutional doctrines could no longer be applied
without any change. The crux of the problem is that the platforms are
privately owned. In formal terms, they are simply market players which
are not bound by the guarantees of freedom of speech imposed on public
bodies and which may enjoy the protection of freedom of speech
themselves.
This Article addresses the issue of the restriction of freedom of
speech by social media platforms. Section II delineates traditional
media and social media platforms, which is a prerequisite for further
reflection on appropriate regulation. Section III examines the issues
raised by the deletion of user content by platforms. Based on the
fundamentals of European media regulation, Section IV raises the issue
of the responsibility of social media platforms to maintain the
appropriate quality of democratic publicity. Closing the article, Section
V summarizes the conclusions. This Article will present European and
U.S. regulatory approaches in parallel, considering both legacy media
and social media platforms. The Author of this Article, coming from
Europe, undertakes to place the European approach at the forefront,
highlighting where it conflicts with the U.S. concept of freedom of
speech. However, given that the issues raised by social media platforms
are similar everywhere and their regulation is the subject of similar
debates worldwide, it cannot be ruled out that European solutions could
at least help shape the U.S. academic community’s further thinking.
II. DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS AND LEGACY
MEDIA
The operation of social media platforms is fundamentally different
from that of “legacy” media. In essence, content on these platforms is
created independently of the platforms. However, in the process of
publishing and the aftermath, the platform becomes similar in
operation to the media and the editorial activity they perform. This
fundamental discrepancy and the similarity which exists call for a
precise delineation of services in order to define the precise set of
liability rules applicable to them. In practice, this means examining
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whether existing and mature regulatory solutions and liability regimes
for legacy media can be applied, at least in some respects, to social
media.
A. The Notion of Online Gatekeepers and Platforms
A gatekeeper is an entity tasked with deciding if a person or thing
can pass through a “gate” controlled by the gatekeeper.1 Gatekeepers
have existed in all historic periods of public communication and
defining their legal status has often caused problems for the law.
Generally, newspaper kiosks, postal carriers, or cable and satellite
providers were not considered to have a direct impact on the media
content they made available to the public. A postal carrier or cable
provider could prevent individual readers or viewers from accessing
information by refusing to deliver a paper or fix a network error
(thereby also hurting its own financial interests), but it was not in a
position to decide on the content of newspaper articles or television
programs. Such actors had limited potential to interfere with the
communication process, even though they were indispensable parts of
it, and this made them a tempting target for governments seeking to
regulate, or at least keep within certain boundaries, the freedom of
speech of others by regulating the intermediaries.
Even though the Internet seems to provide direct and unconditional
access for persons wishing to exercise their freedom of speech in public,
gatekeepers still remain an indispensable part of the communication
process. A gatekeeper is more specifically defined as a person or entity
whose activity is necessary for publishing the opinion of another person
or entity, and gatekeepers include Internet service providers, blog host
providers, social media, search engine providers, entities selling apps,
webstores, news portals, news aggregating sites, and the content
providers of websites who can decide on the publication of comments to
individual posts. Some gatekeepers may be influential or even
indispensable, with a considerable impact on public communication,
while other gatekeepers may have more limited powers, and may even
go unnoticed by the public. It is true that all gatekeepers are capable of
influencing the public without being government actors, and that they
are usually even more effective at influencing it than governments
themselves.2 As private entities, they are not bound by the
constitutional rules pertaining to free speech, so they can establish
their own service rules concerning that freedom.

1. EMILY B. LAIDLAW, REGULATING SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 37 (2015).
2. Id. at 39.
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According to the classification developed by Emily Laidlaw, “Internet
gatekeepers” form the largest group and they control the flow of
information. Among these entities, the “Internet information
gatekeepers” form a smaller group, and through this control they are
capable of affecting individuals’ participation in democratic discourse
and public debate.3 In this model, a gatekeeper belongs to the latter
group if it is capable of facilitating or hindering democratic discourse.4
Such activities raise more direct questions regarding the enforcement of
the freedom of speech, on the side both of the party influenced by the
gatekeeper and of the gatekeeper itself.
As Uta Kohl notes, the most important theoretical questions
pertaining to the gatekeepers of the Internet relate to whether they
play an active or a passive role in the communication process, the
nature of their editorial activities, and the extent of the similarities
between their editorial activities and actual editing.5 The role of online
gatekeepers is usually not passive. They are key actors of the
democratic public sphere and actively involved in the communication
process, including making decisions about what their users can access
and what they cannot, or can access only with substantial difficulty.
The European Union (E.U.) Directive, which regulates, in part, the
activities of individual gatekeepers, does not require such gatekeepers
to acknowledge their own role as editors. But it does allow them to be
held liable for infringements in accordance with their relationship with
the content. Gatekeepers may not be held liable if they are not actively
involved in the public transmission of unlawful content, or if it is not
aware of the infringing nature of the content, but they are required to
remove such content after becoming aware of the infringement.6
However, this does not prevent gatekeepers from sorting through the
various pieces of content of their own volition and in a manner
permitted by law. Under the current legal approach, gatekeepers are
not considered as “media services.” This means that while they do
demand protection for the freedom of speech in order to enable their
selection activities, they are not bound by the various legal guarantees

3. Id. at 44.
4. Id. at 46.
5. Uta Kohl, Intermediaries within Online Regulation, in INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY LAW 85–87 (Diane Rowland, Uta Kohl & Andrew Charlesworth eds., 5th ed.
2016).
6. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the internal market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’, ‘E-Commerce
Directive’), 2000 O.J. (L 178), arts. 12–15.
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concerning the right of individuals to access the media.7 They are also
not subject to obligations that are otherwise applicable to the media as
a private institution of constitutional value,8 as it is conceptualized in
the European legal approach.9
Online platforms are considered among the most influential
gatekeepers in the online sphere. The term online platform “refers to an
undertaking operating in two (or multi)-sided markets, which uses the
Internet to enable interactions between two or more distinct but
interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one
of the groups.”10 Search engines, new aggregators, online marketplaces,
audiovisual and music platforms, video sharing platforms, and social
media are all different types of online platforms. Several definitions
exist for social media platforms. For example, according to Aleksandra
Gebicka and Andreas Heinemann, social media platforms are
“web-based services that allow individuals to construct a public or
semi-public profile within a limited forum, to articulate a list of other
users with whom they share a connection (friends on Facebook), and to
view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others
within the system.”11 Online platforms are used not only by private
individuals but also by commercial enterprises, public figures
(politicians among them), and mainstream media outlets, to name a
few.
B. Platform Speech and Media Speech
The concept of editorial activities is a key part of the notion of
“media.”12 Theoretically, if the activities of gatekeepers are similar to
7. RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO THE MEDIA (András Sajó & Monroe Price eds., 1996).
8. William J. Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979).
9. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS, A
GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION: NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES,
MAGAZINES, AND BOOKS (1947); JOHN C. NERONE, LAST RIGHTS: REVISITING FOUR
THEORIES OF THE PRESS 77-100 (1995).
10. European Commission, Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for
Platforms, Online Intermediariesm Data and Cloud Computing and the Collaborative,
ECONOMY 5 (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultationregulatory-environment-platforms-onlineintermediaries-data-and-cloud.
11. Aleksandra Gebicka & Andreas Heinemann, Social Media & Competition Law,
WORLD COMPETITION 149, 152 (2014).
12. Matthew Ingram, Sorry Mark Zuckerberg, but Facebook is Definitely a Media
Company, FORTUNE (Aug. 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/30/facebook-mediacompany; Samuel Gibbs, Mark Zuckerberg Appears to Finally Admit Facebook is a Media
Company,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
22,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/22/mark-zuckerberg-appears-to-finallyadmit-facebook-is-a-media-company.
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such editorial activities, the gatekeepers themselves may be subject to
media regulation to a certain extent; otherwise, they may be considered
technology companies.
The terms “editing,” “editorial decision-making,” and “editorial
discretion” are usually not defined in legal documents. For the media,
these refer to making unavoidable decisions on the content of a given
medium, decisions which are indispensable for the operation of any
medium. Note that in the context of the press, radio, television, and a
considerable number of websites, editors make decisions on content that
was commissioned by them or produced by their colleagues like
journalists or producers.
The definition of commonplace editorial activity is set in the E.U.
Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Directive within the following
notion of “editorial responsibility”:
‘editorial responsibility’ means the exercise of effective control both
over the selection of the programs and over their organization either
in a chronological schedule, in the case of television broadcasts, or in
a catalogue, in the case of on-demand audiovisual media services.
Editorial responsibility does not necessarily imply any legal liability
under national law for the content or the services provided.13

According to this definition, the editor of a media service is the
person who selects and compiles the programs to be published, and
without whom such programs would not reach the public. The editor of
a press outlet commissions and selects the articles to be published in
that paper. This traditional editorial control has several components:
The editor influences (1) the creation of the content by instructing the
journalist, commissions content from external suppliers, (2) the
publication of the content, and also (3) how, where, and when the
content becomes accessible compared to other content.14 Editorial
control and editorial responsibility are different notions, but in legacy
media in general one entails the other: the editor deciding on the
publication is responsible for any infringement caused by the content.
The activities of social media platforms are considerably different from
this model, as the users produce and share independent content en
masse, and the platform operator normally does not interfere with this

13. Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of
audiovisual media services (AVMS Directive), 2010 O.J. (L 95), art. 1(d)(bb).
14. Max Z. van Drunen, The Post-Editorial Control Era: How EU media Law Matches
Platforms’ Organisational Control with Cooperative Responsibility, 12(2) JOURNAL OF
MEDIA LAW 166, 169–71 (2020).
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process. However, some aspects of this model are quite similar to
traditional editing. Gatekeepers do not usually decide on the
publication of any content prior to its publication, but they may decide
to remove a piece of content subsequently either voluntarily or to
perform a legal obligation. In certain cases, gatekeepers may even
prevent the publication of a piece of content through preliminary
filtering, and similarly they may display some content to the users in a
prominent place while almost hiding other content.
The activities of social media platforms are also characterized by two
of the three above-listed elements of editorial control. The platform can
make a decision on the publication of the content, although—unlike
legacy media—this does not represent a full preliminary decision but,
for example, the setting of filters or deletion subsequently.
Furthermore, the platform also decides how, where, and to whom user
content will be made available. Max van Drunen calls this
“organi[z]ational control.”15 It is largely up to the platform to decide (or
dependent on the settings of the algorithm regulating this issue) which
user may access what content, what appears in a prominent location for
him, what content he needs to search for, and what he cannot access at
all. In addition, user decisions (namely, which user is a “friend,” what
they “like” or mark as important, etc.) themselves influence what
content the platform offers them. In general, social media platforms can
influence the content (for example, the newsfeed of Facebook) displayed
to their users in line with their own interests. Notably, such editing is
performed in bulk and on a daily basis, using both artificial intelligence
and human resources, with a view to improving service quality or
serving business or other interests. In Europe, such editing is
performed to comply with legal obligations if required for the removal of
violating content16 or the protection of personal data.17
It is clear the law is heading towards regarding gatekeepers as
editors, and another step in this direction is the 2018 amendment of the
AVMS Directive on the regulation of video sharing platforms including
social media platforms allowing the publication of audiovisual content.
While the AVMS Directive emphasizes that “video-sharing platform
services” do not bear any “editorial responsibility,” they still may be
subject to content-related obligations with regard to the protection of
children and taking action against hate speech. The Directive

15. Id. at 171–173.
16. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 6, arts. 12–14.
17. Case C-131/12, 13 May 2014, (CVRIA, No. Google Spain SL, Google, Inc. v.
Agencia Española de Protección Datos Mario Costeja González, judgment [GC], 13 May
2014).
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recognizes that such platforms organize (such as display, tag, and
sequence) user content, and, when accompanied by an obligation to take
action against infringing content, their role is clearly similar to editing:
(aa) “video-sharing platform service” means a service, as defined by
Articles 56 and 57 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, [which meets the following requirements:] . . .
[(i) the service consists of the storage of a large amount of]
program[]es [or] user-generated videos, . . . for which the
video-sharing platform provider does not have editorial
responsibility;
[(ii) the organi[z]ation of the stored content is determined by the
provider of the service including] by automatic means or algorithms,
in particular by hosting, displaying, tagging and sequencing.18

As Philip Napoli notes, there is nothing new about the media
wanting to provide their audience with what they are looking for, what
they are interested in, or what they enjoy watching, listening to, or
reading. Social media platforms also do this, par excellence, mapping
user needs with much more sophisticated tools.19 Platforms decide
which user content is accessible (by deleting content which public
authorities order to be removed or that violate their own policies) and
which of the theoretically available content does actually appear to
users. Social media platforms are both indispensable helpers of the
legacy media, making masses of people accessible to them, and of their
direct competitors competing for commercial revenue coming from the
same sources. Large platforms are part of the public sphere as arenas
for disseminating news, opinion articles, and information of public
interest. Their market position and their ability to intervene in what is
offered also make the platforms a de facto news service, even if not in
its legal sense.20
From the regulatory point of view, treating platforms in the same
way as legacy media in terms of editorial control would have quite
different consequences in Europe and the U.S. The constitutional
protection of the right to “press freedom” has led to different conclusions

18. Directive 2018/1808/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the
provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of
changing market realities (new AVMS directive), 2018 O.J. (L 303), art. 1(b)(aa).
19. PHILIP M. NAPOLI, SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 11–14 (2019).
20. Id. at 13.
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on the two sides of the Atlantic.21 In the United States, the restrictions
on freedom of speech and freedom of the press coincide, since in the
interpretation of the Constitution and in the case law of the Supreme
Court22—contrary to Europe—the exercise of freedom of the press does
not entail any additional obligation. In the U.S., content regulation is
only permitted to a very narrow extent,23 and editorial freedom cannot
be interfered with by state regulations at all.24 As such, if the U.S. legal
system were to regard social media as a news service and the companies
engaged in editorial activities as media actors, it would not directly
reduce its freedom to assess and arrange user content, but it may also
have other consequences, detrimental to the platforms.25 Conversely, if
all this took place in Europe, theoretically, a platform could benefit
from and exercise additional rights related to media freedom, but it
would also be subject to certain additional obligations.26 Platforms are
not eager to be considered “media,” even in the U.S., because it would
set a dangerous example that could weaken their European position or
have detrimental consequences for them in other countries.
C. The Problem of Artificial Intelligence
Due to the large volumes of data transmitted, gatekeepers use not
only human resources, but also algorithms to process information. A
term borrowed from mathematics, an algorithm is a method, guideline,
or set of instructions that consists of a sequence of steps and is suitable
for solving a problem.27 In general, computer programs embody
algorithms used to instruct a computer how to execute a task. In the
context of gatekeepers, a decision concerning the flow of information
(that is the filtering, removal of higher or lower ranking of content and
its presentation to users) is usually determined by an algorithm,
meaning that the legal status of such decisions, as well as the nature
and subject of legal rights and obligations, poses fundamental
21. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (2004); STEPHEN M. FEILDMAN,
FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2015); David Anderson,
Origins of the Free Press Clause, 30(3) UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983).
22. Sonja West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1068–1070
(2010–2011); Sonja West, Press Exceptionalism, 127(8) HARV. L. REV. 2443 (2014).
23. Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
24. Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974).
25. See infra Section IV.
26. See infra Section IV.
27. Definition
of
Algorithm,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/algorithm.
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questions. An algorithm is a kind of editor, which presents the user
with content according to the decisions of its creator and employing
data collected about the user during the use of the service or other
services (concerning his or her interests and preferences).28 The control
exercised by social media platforms includes the power to decide who
may reach the public, who is banned from the public, who is to follow
the rules of the public, and who is to remain silent.29
Hence, if editing by social media platforms is largely, but not
exclusively, carried out by these algorithms, the question rightly arises
as to whether this activity can actually be considered to belong within
the scope of editorial freedom and whether it needs to consequently also
be subject in Europe to restrictions on editorial freedom. Individual
legal systems treat the legacy media’s editing activities in the same way
as speech, and unnecessary or excessive restrictions on editorial
freedom are seen as an infringement of freedom of the press.
Consequently, the question of whether the outcome of the operation of
artificial intelligence and algorithms constitutes editing, and therefore
whether this qualifies as speech needs to be answered.
It is a reasonable question whether the communication produced
with the help of algorithms used by gatekeepers is protected by the
freedom of speech. If an algorithm conducts editing, meaning that it
makes decisions concerning the sorting, removal, and ranking of pieces
of content, it might be considered speech. Such decisions have a
fundamental impact on the public appearance of the actual speaker,
who is preferred or disfavored by the algorithm, giving the decision of
the algorithm a certain communicative content that is protected under
the aegis of the freedom of speech. Such decisions also convey a
material communicative message to other users, which influences the
capability of such users to access information. For this reason, such
users experience the decision as an opinion even more directly.30 On the
other hand, it may be argued that a decision made by an algorithm—
such as a search ranking or the compilation of a news stream—is fully
automated and without any actual content (it only sorts through or
makes other kinds of decisions concerning the content of others),
meaning that it should be considered as an action instead of speech.
Indeed, the algorithms of gatekeepers often operate without any

28. Sue Halpern, Mind Control & the Internet, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (June
23,
2011)
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2011/06/23/mind-control-andinternet/?printpage=true.
29. Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 CLQ 235, 250 (2014).
30. Stuart M. Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447
(2013).
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communicative content—think of the operation of the TCP/IP protocol
or cache storage, which do not convey any message to users.31
Tim Wu argues that the activities of devices needed to convey speech,
but which merely transmit information without making any decision,
may not be considered speech.32 A typical embodiment of this
proposition in the offline world is a telephone service. On the other
hand, cable television services are different, in that cable service
providers make decisions or edit how to present a channel to the
audience.33 Wu also argues that the activities of an online gatekeeper
should be considered action instead of speech if they are merely
functional, in the sense that they are necessary to transmit the speech
of others but do not carry any independent meaning themselves and
considers the search rankings of a search engine to be without such
meaning.34 The legal approach toward search engines is a complex
matter and will be revisited later. Probably even Wu would agree the
activities of Facebook go beyond being merely functional and convey
material messages in and of themselves, because a personalized news
stream is compiled for each user upon login (selecting some of the
content available to the user). It seems inevitable that the activities of
an editing algorithm must be considered speech, as the algorithm
conveys a material message itself. In addition to the trends in legal
development, a reason for this is that such activities are experienced by
their recipients as speech. However, it seems unlikely that decisions
made by algorithms and human beings can be distinguished from each
other in a consistent manner.35
If they are not recognized as speech, the most important services and
activities of social media platforms can be regulated without respect for
the most fundamental constitutional protection, that is, the guarantees
of freedom of expression. Whereas recognition as speech also implies
that the algorithms would also be expected to respect the limits of
freedom of speech, and the providers of services using such algorithms
would not be exempted from the application of general laws that are not
related to the content of speech (such as anti-trust or tax laws).
It also seems clear that such communicating algorithms do not make
decisions on their own, and the actual person who created the program

31. Id. at 1471.
32. Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1525–33 (2013).
33. Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 512 U.S.
622 (1994); Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 520
U.S. 180 (1997).
34. Wu, supra note 32, at 1524–31.
35. Benjamin, supra note 30, at 1493.
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is always there in the background, generally making editorial decisions,
that is, determining the way the program should operate. In the end,
the “machine does not speak”36 and, obviously, it does not become a
beneficiary of freedom of speech. Still, we can agree with Stuart
Benjamin, who stated that, in terms of the exercise of free speech,
differentiation between decisions made by the algorithm and by
humans can only be done arbitrarily.37 A decision made by an algorithm
(deleting or, on the contrary, highlighting a piece of content, or possibly
hiding it without deleting it) carries meaning, therefore constitutes
speech for the legal system, so the company operating the algorithm can
benefit from the constitutional protection of speech, but must also bear
its burden. Accepting this would involve legal systems, for example, in
the case of Facebook, identifying each user feed compiled by the
platform’s algorithm, the compilation of which is influenced by the
user’s decisions as speech, and defining the outcome of editorial
activity, and the platform running the algorithm as a publisher in legal
terms, together with all the inherent positive and negative
consequences that come with it.38 After all, the platform itself has the
final say on what is published on the platform; it retains editorial
control, even if such control differs from editing in legacy media in
many respects.
III. THE REGULATION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BY SOCIAL MEDIA
PLATFORMS
Platforms are not neutral actors in the public communication
process. Their decisions on content selection are protected expressions
of the platforms’ freedom of speech. At the same time, similarly to
legacy media, legislation also limits the decision-making freedom of
platforms, imposing obligations on them to take action against illegal
content. The nature of this obligation and the liability regime associated
with it differ fundamentally on the two sides of the Atlantic. In
addition, user content may be deleted, filtered, or blocked at the
discretion of the platform, in accordance with the terms of the contract
it concluded with the users. The rules of the two parallel sets of norms,
that is those of the legal regulation by each system, are also binding on
platforms and those of the contract, and apply only between the
platform and the user. These differ by protecting or restricting users’
36. Id. at 1479.
37. Id. at 1493–94; Stuart M. Benjamin, The First Amendment and Algorithms, THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 630–31 (Woodrow Barfield ed., 2021).
38. Alan M. Sears, Algorithmic Speech and Freedom of Expression, 53(4) VANDERBILT
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1327, 1373 (2020).
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freedom of speech to different degrees. This discrepancy brings
detrimental and dangerous consequences for the public sphere.
A. The Regulation of Social Media Platforms in Europe and in the
United States—A Quick Overview
1. The European Union and its Member States
If gatekeepers provide only technical services when they make
available, store, or transmit the content of others (much like a printing
house or a newspaper stand), then it would seem unjustified to hold
them liable for the violations of others, as long as they are unaware of
the violation. However, according to the European approach, the
gatekeepers may be held liable for their own failure to act after
becoming aware of the violation if they fail to remove the infringing
material. The relevant E.U. Directive requires intermediaries to remove
such materials after becoming aware of their infringing nature.39
Even though the gatekeeper activities falling within the scope of the
Directive (namely, mere conduit, caching, and hosting) play an
important role in online communication, the issue of liability has arisen
since 2000, the year of adoption of the Directive, with regard to various
gatekeepers that did not even exist at the time, or which were not
included in the scope of legislation for other reasons (for example,
search engines or social media platforms). In the absence of a better
analogy, courts tend to liken such entities, for example, to hosting
providers. The material scope of the regulation is of great importance: if
certain conditions are met, the E.U. Directive exempts gatekeepers
from liability even if they let violating pieces of content pass. This
exemption-based system should not necessarily be considered outdated,
but something has certainly changed since 2000: there are fewer and
fewer reasons to believe that the gatekeepers of today remain passive
regarding content and perform nothing more than storage and
transmission. While content is still produced by users or other
independent actors, the services of gatekeepers select from and
organize, promote, or reduce the ranking of such content, and may even
delete it or make it unavailable within the system. The fairness rule of
the Directive that grants exemption to a passive actor as long as it does
not get involved in the process (that is, until it becomes aware of the
violation) seems less and less to be the only feasible solution to the
problem of the new gatekeepers. Still, it seems true that the volume of
content processed by the new gatekeepers makes it impossible and
unreasonable to impose a comprehensive obligation to control prior to
39. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 6, arts. 12–14.
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publication, or even after publication without the requirement of an
external notice. Accordingly, Articles 12 to 14 grant wide exemptions to
gatekeepers. For hosting providers (social media platforms among
them), this means that a provider is not held liable for the transmission
or storage of infringing content, if it is not its own content and it is not
aware of the infringing nature of the content, provided that it takes
action to remove the information or make it inaccessible without
delay.40 If such measures are not taken, the provider may be held liable
for its own omission. In addition, the Directive also stipulates that
intermediaries may not be subject to a general monitoring obligation to
identify illegal activities.41
The notion of “illegal” raises an important issue, as the obligation of
removal is independent from the outcome of an eventual court or official
procedure that may establish the violation, and the storage provider is
required to take action before a decision is passed, provided that a legal
procedure is initiated at all. This means that the provider has to decide
on the issue of illegality on its own, and its decision is free from any
legal guarantee, even though it may have an impact on freedom of
speech. This rule may encourage the provider concerned to remove
content to escape liability, even in highly questionable situations. It
would be comforting—but probably inadequate, considering the speed of
communication—if the liability of an intermediary could not be
established unless the illegal nature of the content it has not removed is
established by a court.42
The interpretation of the Directive has been somewhat clarified by
certain decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. One of
the cases related to the protection of intellectual property. In Google
France v. Louis Vuitton,43 the Court held that the storage provider
(Google’s AdWords service) was exempted from liability, as:
“the rule laid down therein applies to an Internet referencing service
provider in the case where that service provider has not played an
active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over,
the data stored. If it has not played such a role, that service provider
cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at the request of

40. Id. at art. 14.
41. Id. at art. 15.
42. Christina M. Mulligan, Technological Intermediaries and Freedom of the Press, 66
SMU L. REV. 157, 175 (2013).
43. Joined Cases of C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France S.A.R.L. and Google, Inc. v.
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159. Cour de Cassation [Final
court of appeals] Joined Cases of C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France S.A.R.L. and
Google, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. and Others, 23 March 2010.

2022

THE PROTECTION OF FREEDOM

537

an advertiser,” provided that it took action after becoming aware of
the situation.44

According to the judgment handed down in L’Oréal SA and Others v.
eBay International and Others,45 the operator of a webstore is not liable
for any content uploaded by a client because “the mere fact that the
operator of an online marketplace stores offers for sale on its server,
sets the terms of its service, is remunerated for that service and
provides general information to its customers cannot have the effect of
denying it the exemptions from liability.”46 However, the exemption
applies only as long as it remains neutral toward the respective piece of
content:
Where, by contrast, the operator has provided assistance which
entails, in particular, optimi[z]ing the presentation of the offers for
sale in question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not
to have taken a neutral position between the customer-seller
concerned and potential buyers but to have played an active role of
such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data
relating to those offers for sale. It cannot then rely, in the case of
those data, on the exemption from liability referred to in Article 14(1)
of Directive 2000/31.47

The question is thus whether the host provider could have been
aware of the infringing content.48 The above rulings are to be regarded
in light of the absence of a general monitoring and control obligation, as
providers may not be required to implement such general technical
solutions (filtering).49
In other areas, the situation of gatekeepers seems less comfortable.
The directive on combating terrorism sets forth a similar obligation to
remove content.50 Data protection regulations require gatekeepers to

44. Id. at para. 120.
45. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal S.A. and Others v. eBay International A.G. and Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:474.
46. Id. at para. 115.
47. Id. at para. 116.
48. Id. at para. 120.
49. See also Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended S.A. v. Société belge des auteurs,
compositeurs et éditeurs S.C.R.L. (SABAM), ECLI:EU:C:2011:771; Case C‑360/10
Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers C.V.B.A. (SABAM) v.
Netlog N.V., ECLI:EU:C:2012:85.
50. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88), Art. 21.
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comply with data protection rules regarding their own activities (that
is, the obligation does not arise as a result of a possible violation by
another person or user).51 It also seems possible for a court of a member
state to decide that the activities of a certain gatekeeper are not covered
by the E-Commerce Directive (namely, it does not qualify as a host
provider), meaning that the general rules of civil and criminal law may
be applied. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) did not
object to this interpretation when the content provider of a website was
held liable by a national court for comments posted anonymously.52
On-demand media services have fallen within the scope of the AVMS
Directive since 2007. Such services can be accessed through the
Internet, but social media are not one form of such services. The main
reason for this is that providers of on-demand media services bear
editorial responsibility for the content they publish, they order and
purchase such content, and they have a final say in publishing a piece
of content.53 However, social media only provides a communication
platform because it may not make any decision regarding a piece of
content before it is published. The situation is different if some kind of
preliminary filtering is used, but such filtering affects only specific
types of content.
As social media platforms spread, it became clear, about a decade
after the previous amendment of the Directive, that media regulation
could not be interpreted in such a restrictive manner any longer. As
already mentioned, the recently amended AVMS Directive introduced
the terms “video-sharing platform service” and “video-sharing platform
provider.”54 According to the amendment eventually adopted in
November 2018, the material scope of the Directive was extended to
cover such services. Even though the original proposal would not have
extended the scope of the Directive to social media platforms (in terms
of the audiovisual content uploaded to the site), it became clear during
the legislative process that they could not be exempted from the
Directive, and it could not focus solely on portals used to share videos,

See Monica Horten, Content “Responsibility”: The Looming Cloud of Uncertainty for
Internet Intermediaries 12, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY.
51. Case C-131/12 Google Spain; Regulation (EU) 2016/679, General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), art. 17.
52. Eur. Ct. H.R. Delfi A.S. v. Estonia, no. 64569/09, judgment of 15 June 2015 [GC];
Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt. v. Hungary, no. 22947/13,
judgment of 6 February 2016.
53. AVMS Directive, supra note 13, art. 1.
54. New AVMS Directive, supra note 18, art. 1(1)b(aa).
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such as YouTube.55 For this reason, the recital of the amending
Directive provides:
Video-sharing platform services provide audiovisual content which is
increasingly accessed by the general public, in particular by young
people. This is also true with regard to social media services, which
have become an important medium to share information and to
entertain and educate, including by providing access to programmes
and user-generated videos. Those social media services need to be
included in the scope of Directive 2010/13/EU because they compete
for the same audiences and revenues as audiovisual media services.
Furthermore, they also have a considerable impact in that they
facilitate the possibility for users to shape and influence the opinions
of other users. Therefore, in order to protect minors from harmful
content and all citizens from incitement to hatred, violence and
terrorism, those services should be covered by Directive 2010/13/EU
to the extent that they meet the definition of a video-sharing
platform service.56

This means that, despite their somewhat misleading name,
video-sharing platforms include audiovisual content published on social
media platforms. Article 28b of the amended AVMS Directive provides
that Articles 12 to 15 of the E-Commerce Directive—in particular, the
provisions on hosting service providers and the prohibition on
introducing a general monitoring obligation—remain applicable.
Member States must ensure that video-sharing platform providers
operating within their respective jurisdiction “take appropriate
measures” to ensure four things. First, the protection of minors from
programs, user-generated videos, and audiovisual commercial
communications that may impair their physical, mental, or moral
development. Second, the protection of the general public from
programs including user-generated videos and audiovisual commercial
communications containing incitement to violence or hatred directed
against a group of persons or a member of a group. Third, the protection
of the general public from programs, user-generated videos, and
audiovisual commercial communications containing content the
dissemination of which constitutes an activity that is a criminal offense
under E.U. law, namely public provocation to commit a terrorist offence
within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2017/541, offenses
concerning child pornography within the meaning of Article 5(4) of
55. Duncan Robinson, Social Networks Face Tougher EU Oversight on Video Content
8, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d5746e06-3fd7-11e7-82b6896b95f30f58.
56. New AVMS Directive, supra note 18, recital (4).
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Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council,
and offen[s]es concerning racism and xenophobia within the meaning of
Article 1 of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA. Fourth, compliance
with the requirements set out in Article 9(1) with respect to audiovisual
commercial communications that are marketed, sold, or arranged by the
video-sharing platform providers (general restrictions of commercial
communications and provisions in order to safeguard minors from
commercials).
What constitutes an “appropriate measure” is to be determined with
regard to the nature of the content in question, the harm it may cause
and the characteristics of the category of persons to be protected, as
well as the rights and legitimate interests at stake. This includes those
of the video-sharing platform providers and the users who created,
transmitted, and/or uploaded the content, as well as the public
interest.57 According to the Directive, such measures should extend to
eight actions (among others). First, defining and applying the
above-mentioned requirements in the terms and conditions of the
video-sharing platform providers. Second, establishing and operating
transparent and user-friendly mechanisms for users of video-sharing
platforms to report or flag up content to the video-sharing platform
provider concerned. Third, establishing and operating age verification
systems for users of video-sharing platforms with respect to content
that may impair the physical, mental, or moral development of minors
with a view to protecting children. Fourth, providing parental control
systems with respect to content that may be harmful for minors. Fifth,
providing users with easy-to-use means of identifying violating content.
Sixth, establishing and operating transparent, easy-to-use and efficient
procedures for managing and settling disputes between video-sharing
platform providers and users. Seventh, providing information and
explanations from service providers regarding the protective measures.
Eighth, implementing effective measures and controls aimed at media
awareness, and providing users with information regarding such
measures and controls.58
While the new provisions of the Directive appear rather detailed, the
major platform providers have already been making efforts to comply
with the requirements that have now become mandatory. The
regulation applies to only a narrow range of content—namely,
audiovisual content—and government is only granted control over the
operation of platform providers in connection with a handful of
content-related issues, such as protection of minors, hate speech,
57. Id. at art. 28b(3).
58. Id.
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support for terrorism, child pornography, and denial of genocide. Such
content is in any case commonly banned or removed by the platforms
upon receiving notice of it under their own policies. Nonetheless, not all
content prohibited in Europe is inconsistent with such policies. Once
the provisions of the Directive are transposed into the national law of
E.U. Member States, platform providers will be required to take action
under both the E-Commerce Directive and the AVMS Directive. These
two pieces of legislation act mostly in parallel, as the former requires
infringing content to be removed in general, while the latter defines
certain types of infringing content and lays down detailed rules for their
removal. The AVMS Directive lays down numerous provisions that both
facilitate the application of the rules and work as procedural
safeguards.
2. The United States
In the U.S., the liability of gatekeepers is regulated on the basis of a
different theoretical background. For the purpose of ensuring the
smooth growth and economic strengthening of Internet companies, the
courts took a step backwards by claiming to protect freedom of speech.59
Today, gatekeepers are granted virtually complete immunity when it
comes to infringing content of others.
Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA)60 lays
down the “Good Samaritan” protection for the providers of “interactive
computer services”:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of
offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of—

59. Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 641
(2014).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
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(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to
material described in paragraph (1).61

However, the protection is not complete and unconditional. The
provision relies on judicial case law to establish when a gatekeeper
becomes a publisher or speaker, thereby losing its immunity, and
Subparagraph (E) stipulates that the protection does not apply in the
event of committing a federal crime, or violating communications
privacy laws, sex trafficking laws, or intellectual property rights.
It seems clear that the CDA explicitly allows gatekeepers to make
content-related decisions: gatekeepers are free to decide which pieces of
content to remove and how to present content to their users, and this
fact implies the restriction of their freedom of speech, even if not in the
legal sense.62 Section 230 has given rise to extensive case law, which
seems to interpret the obligations of a “Good Samaritan” in a restrictive
manner. In Zeran v. AOL,63 the court established that exemption from
liability does not cease to exist when a letter or takedown notice is sent
to a service provider drawing its attention to the infringing content. The
judgment also noted that the publication, editing and removal of a piece
of content falls within the discretion of the service provider, and it does
not exclude its immunity.
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com,64 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled against the operator of the website. The website was
meant to bring together co-tenants (such as students living away from
home), so that accommodation-seekers could specify the features of
persons with whom they would be willing to live, thereby excluding
persons of different races and colors, while they were required to specify
their own characteristics. The website operator was held liable for such
discriminatory practices, as it encouraged its users to violate the
requirement of equal treatment by performing targeted searches.

61. Id.
62. See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1009 (2008).
63. 129 F.3d 327 (1997).
64. 521 F.3d 1157 (2008).
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This interpretation of the law was weakened by the judgment passed
in Jane Doe v. Backpage.com.65 The users of the website in this case
were allowed to publish advertisements, including solicitations for
prostitution, and the plaintiffs argued that this may have facilitated the
trafficking of human beings for sexual purposes. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the decision made by the
website operator on the organization of user content and establishing
the rules of publication did not prevent him from invoking the
immunity granted by section 230 CDA. This decision goes against the
conclusions reached in the above-mentioned Roommates.com case.
Backpage’s offering of adult services sections remained highly
controversial, due to allegations that Backpage knowingly allowed and
encouraged users to post ads relating to prostitution and human
trafficking, particularly involving minors, and took steps to
intentionally obfuscate the activities. After a series of court cases and
the arrest of the company’s CEO and other officials, Backpage removed
the adult services subsection in the U.S. in 2017. On April 6, 2018,
Backpage.com and affiliated websites were seized by the federal law
enforcement bodies.66
Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,67 involved a social media service through which
a user contacted and, in the course of a personal meeting, eventually
sexually molested another user. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuitt held that the website provided only a means of
communication to its users, and it was not held liable for the crime
committed. Similarly, a service provider may not be held liable if its
social media service is used to organize the perpetration of an act of
terror.68
B. Protecting User Speech from Social Media Platforms
1. Private Regulation by Social Media Platforms—A Primer
Under the European regulation, social media platforms can be forced
to assume some kinds of editorial tasks, as the law requires them to
assess the legality of content and to remove illegal content when
notified. There are other situations where platforms proceed on their

65. 817 F.3d 12 (2016).
66. Paul Demko, The Sex-Trafficking Case Testing the Limits of the First Amendment,
POLITICO (July 29, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/29/firstamendment-limits-backpage-escort-ads-219034.
67. 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
68. Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Cohen v. Facebook,
Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
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own initiative and decided on the status of user-generated content. Jack
Balkin calls this phenomenon “private governance.”69 Others prefer to
use the less euphemistic term “private censorship.”70 However, the term
“private regulation” also seems to capture the essence of the matter,
whereby a platform provider influences the publication or further
accessibility of content published by users to an extent and in a manner
permitted by law by exercising its ownership rights over the platform
and other rights stipulated in its contract with the users.
Platform providers can have different motives for adopting private
regulations. An obvious motive for doing so is to protect their business
interests. Platform providers have an interest in making sure that their
users feel safe while using their platform and are not confronted by
insulting, upsetting, or disturbing content. The moderation and removal
of such content is not done in line with the limitations of free speech,
meaning that a piece of content may be removed using this logic even if
it would otherwise be permitted by law, while a piece of content may
remain available even if it violates the limitations of free speech. The
typically U.S.–owned and established platforms are in a strange and
somewhat ambivalent situation. On the one hand, their activities are
protected by the First Amendment and the CDA, and their developers
and employees represent a culture of American–style free speech. On
the other hand, the private regulation they apply provides far less
protection for public speech than the U.S. legal system.71 Moreover,
Facebook also tends to remove pieces of content that are clearly
protected by the freedom of speech in Europe in an attempt to provide a
“safe space” for its users.72
A major problem with private regulation is that it may be more strict
and more lenient than government regulation, and, as a result, the
regulation of content is unpredictable. Another significant concern is
that there is no adequate decision-making procedure in place regarding
69. Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1179, 1182 (2018).
70. Marjorie Heins, The Brave New World of Social Media Censorship, 127 HARV. L.
REV. FORUM 325, 325 (2014).
71. Balkin, supra note 69, at 1195; Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People,
Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1625 (2018).
72. See, e.g., Cecilia Rodriguez, Facebook Finally Lands in French Court for Deleting
Nude
Courbet
Painting,
FORBES
(Feb.
5,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ceciliarodriguez/2018/02/05/facebook-finally-lands-in-frenchcourt-for-deleting-nude-courbet-painting (some questionable editorial decisions made
based on the general prohibition of nudity); Sam Levin, Julia C Wong, & Luke Harding,
Facebook Backs Down from “Napalm Girl” Censorship and Reinstates Photo, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/09/facebookreinstates-napalm-girl-photo.
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the removal of pieces of content, meaning that the constitutional
safeguards commonly available in legal proceedings (such as
notification of users concerned, possibility of appeal, due process, the
identification of the decision-maker, publishing decisions in writing so
that they might be known, and so forth) are absent. The absence of an
appropriate procedure greatly contributes to the lack of transparency
regarding decisions made based on private regulation and does nothing
to clarify existing uncertainties concerning the rules applied in such
important forums of public life.
In addition to the ownership of a platform, a contract by and between
the platform and each user serves as the legal basis for the platform’s
capacity to interfere with the freedom of speech of its users. The
provisions of that contract are determined solely by the platform. Users
are not in a position to request the amendment of the contract, while it
may be amended by the platform unilaterally at any time. It is also
important that the same contract is concluded with each and every
user. Even though the contract, and the interference permitted by it,
affects the exercise of a constitutional right, and countless debates,
conversations, and exchanges of information on public affairs are taking
place on the platform at any given time, no interference by the platform
can be considered as state action, and the platform itself is not
considered a public forum. An action taken by a platform, even if it
limits the opinions of its users, cannot be attributed to the government,
meaning that it is not subject to any constitutional safeguard relating to
the freedom of speech.73
In practical terms, the solution to any conflict or dispute that may
arise between a platform provider and a user concerning free speech is
to be found among the rules of contract law and not the various
principles of constitutional law.74 When a user subscribes to a platform
and accepts the terms and conditions of that platform by a simple click
of a mouse, he or she becomes subject to “private regulation,” including
all content-related provisions as well, and the safeguards of free speech
are no longer applicable concerning the user’s relationship with the
platform.75 It should not come as a surprise that the contracts used by
all major platforms are carefully considered and precisely drafted
documents (or, conversely, that they use vague language for the very
purpose of extending the discretionary powers of the platform). A
comparative analysis prepared by Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig
73. Jacquelyn E. Fradette, Online Terms of Service: A Shield for First Amendment
Scrutiny of Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 953–57 (2014).
74. Id. at 971.
75. Id. at 977.
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provides a detailed overview of such contract terms and conditions.76
Their investigations pointed out numerous concerns pertaining to
consumer protection, including the difficulty of reading the provisions,
the arbitration clauses used in such contracts that make it difficult for
users to file a lawsuit, the vague meaning of various provisions, and so
forth.
The current legal framework does not provide users with any
powerful means should they find themselves in a quarrel with the
platform. Even though Section 230 CDA incentivizes platforms not to
use private regulation by granting them immunity regarding illegal
content available on the platforms, it certainly does not prohibit private
censorship.77 Moreover, the European concept of the liability of host
providers (as adopted pursuant to Article 14 of the E-Commerce
Directive) is a direct incentive for platforms to implement private
censorship. Regarding the lack of a balance of power between service
providers and users, any dispute that may arise between them
regarding the enforcement of their contract may be settled within the
legal framework of consumer protection.78 However, this option is
available only if the user concerned qualifies as a consumer, meaning
that it is not available to institutional users (namely, media
businesses).79
Furthermore, consumer protection does not seem to provide any
broad possibilities for protecting the freedom of speech of users when
the platform’s policies and their application are reasonable and
justifiable but not arbitrary, which they typically are. Even though they
might be questionable, it does not suggest any violation of the
consumers’ rights in and of themselves. It seems also difficult to object
to the application of such policies on a legal basis, considering that a
platform is free to determine its own policies and instruct its
moderators without being required to respect the constitutional
safeguards and legal limitations of the freedom of speech. The only
option for a user is to show that the platform removed a piece of content
it was not authorized to remove80—something that seems nothing short
of impossible to demonstrate due to the widely defined limitations of
76. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World Wide Web:
Reforming Social Networks’ Contracting Practices, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1431 (2014).
77. Heins, supra note 70, at 328.
78. See Kevin Park, Facebook Used Takedown and it was Super Effective! Finding a
Framework for Protecting User Rights of Expression on Social Networking Sites, 68 N.Y.U.
ANN. SUR. AM. L. 891 (2013).
79. Supreme Court, Austria, Case C-498/16, Maximilian Schrems v. Facebook
Ireland, Ltd., judgment of 25 January 2018.
80. Fradette, supra note 73, at 957.
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content and the broad discretionary powers of the platform. A user may
also try to make use of the existing anti–discrimination rules if his or
her right to equal treatment is violated, but producing adequate
evidence in such a situation (showing that a piece of content was
removed from one user but was not removed when published by another
user) seems rather difficult, and the enormous volume of content and
the absence of a monitoring obligation on the side of the platform
(which may be invoked as a defense by the platform) also considerably
limit the chances of a user.
The moderation of user–generated content by a platform interferes
with the free speech of its users. Platforms that decide to moderate such
content are trying to walk a tightrope between the “chaos of too much
freedom” and the “sterility of too much control.”81 Not surprisingly,
balancing is not exactly easy. Platforms might be pressured by
governments into removing content that is not necessarily illegal
without conducting an adequate procedure for a number of reasons.82
Platforms also have a number of reasons of their own for interfering
with their users’ free speech. The primary reason, as already
mentioned, is the protection of their own business interests by way of
filtering and removing content that might scare away other users or
any major business partner or advertiser of the platform.
As Kate Klonick pointed out, a social media platform, in the absence
of a more appropriate analogy, must be considered as a new and
independent regulator (governor). It establishes, controls, and operates
its own infrastructure, which is used by users for communication
according to its own interests. It also has a centralized organization
that follows its own pre-determined rules (even if those are not
necessarily accessible to outsiders in detail) and makes ex ante or ex
post decisions regarding various pieces of content.83 In other words, a
platform decides on pieces of content using a particular aggregational
theory of free speech. It seeks to become and remain open and attractive
for as many users as possible while trying to protect its users from
insults or other forms of communication that could scare them away.84
This strange, aggregated, and hybrid system brings together the
principles of the First Amendment and the European approach to free

81. James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J. L. & TECH 42 (2015).
82. Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of
Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 127–29 (2014).
83. Klonick, supra note 71, at 1662–64.
84. Brett J. Johnson, Facebook’s Free Speech Balancing Act: Corporate Social
Responsibility and Norms of Online Discourse, 5 U. BALT. J. MED. L. & ETHICS. 19, 33–34
(2016).
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speech, all interpreted and applied according to the interests of the
platform itself, with possible differences in each state or region
(according to the respective territory’s government’s approach toward
free speech and the platform’s free activities), through decision–making
procedures that are not transparent to the parties concerned.
2. Legislation and Recent Proposals Aiming to Limit the
Powers of Social Media to Restrict User Speech
Some European legislatures already consider the obligation of
removal set forth in Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive to be
insufficient, and they impose additional obligations on platform
providers. The corresponding Act in German law (effective as of
January 1, 2018) is a paramount example of this trend.85 According to
the applicable provisions, all platform providers within the scope of the
Act (namely, platform providers with over two million users from
Germany) must remove all user content that commits certain criminal
offences specified by the Act. Such offenses include defamation,
incitement to hatred, denial of the Holocaust and the spreading of
scare–news.86 Manifestly unlawful pieces of content must be removed
within twenty-four hours after receipt of a notice, while any “ordinary”
unlawful content must be removed within seven days.87 If a platform
fails to remove a given piece of content, it may be subject to a fine of up
to fifty million euro (theoretically, in cases of severe and multiple
violations).88
Some argue that this regulation is inconsistent with the E-Commerce
Directive, as it provides for a general exception, instead of ad hoc
exceptions, from the free movement of services. In addition, the
Directive requires urgency as a condition of applying the exception, but
the German Act does not refer to specific pieces of content, meaning
that it cannot meet that requirement.89 This piece of German legislation
has been widely criticized as limiting the freedom of speech,90 even
85. Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (Network
Enforcement Act, 2017), [Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen
Netzwerken (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz) Artikel 1 G. v 01.09.2017 BGBl. I S. 3352
(Nr. 61)].
86. Id. at Section 1.
87. Id. at Section 3.
88. Id. at Section 4.
89. Gerald Spindler, Internet Intermediary Liability Reloaded: The New German Act
on Responsibility of Social Networks and its (In-)Compatibility with European Law, 8
JIPITEC 166, 167–70 (2017) (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
90. See, e.g., Germany: Flawed Social Media Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 14,
2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law.
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though it does not go much further than the E.U. Directive itself; it
simply refines the provisions of the Directive, lays down the applicable
procedural rules, and sets harsh sanctions for violating platforms.
Nonetheless, the rules are followed in practice, and Facebook seems
eager to perform its obligation to remove objectionable content.91 The
German regulation shows how difficult it is to apply general pieces of
legislation and platform–specific rules simultaneously, and it
demonstrates how governments seek to have social media platforms act
as judges of user-generated content.
France has adopted regulation similar to the German legislation:
platforms must quickly remove pieces of content that are incitements to
hatred once they have been notified of them.92 The law adopted on May
13, 2020 (loi Avia) restricted the general rules of the notification and
removal procedure in several aspects. Platforms are obliged to delete
content that supports terrorism or displays child pornography within
one hour of becoming aware of it, and platform providers are obliged to
remove content that qualifies as other criminal activity within
twenty-four hours. In addition, the law introduced a number of other
rules for the management of user content (platforms must set up an
efficient and easy-to-use notification system; confirmation of the
notification must be sent to the notifier; if the request in the notification
is granted, the deletion must be completed within twenty-four hours; a
remedy must be provided; and if a piece of content is removed, the
author of the content must also be notified if possible, providing him
with a remedy, and so forth).93
In a decision of the French Constitutional Council (Conseil
Constitutionnel) on June 18, 2020, several provisions of the loi Avia
adopted by the parliament were found to be unconstitutional and were
annulled.94 The Constitutional Council found that freedom of speech
may be restricted, but the restrictions must be necessary and
proportionate to the objective pursued. According to the Constitutional

91. Reuters, Facebook Deletes Hundreds of Posts Under German Hate-Speech Law,
REUTERS (July 27, 2018), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-germany/facebookdeletes-hundreds-of-posts-under-german-hate-speech-law-idUKKBN1KH21L.
92. France Online Hate Speech Law to Force Social Media Sites to Act Quickly, THE
GUARDIAN (July 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/09/france-onlinehate-speech-law-social-media.
93. France: Analysis of Draft Hate Speech Bill, ARTICLE 19 (July 3, 2019),
https://www.article19.org/resources/france-analysis-of-draft-hate-speech-bill;
Avia Bill EN, 2019 (No. 310) (Fr.), https://ecnl.org/sites/default/files/files/Text-of-Avia-BillEN.pdf.
94. Décision
n°
2020-801
(June
18,
2020),
https://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2020/2020801DC.htm.
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Council, the infringing nature of the content in question is not
self-evident. Its assessment depends solely on the designated authority.
Furthermore, an appeal against a decision has no suspensive effect on
enforcement and the one-hour timeframe is insufficient for a judicial
decision to be made on the matter. Moreover, given the expected high
number of notifications, the unspecified number of applicants, and the
lack of a judicial decision prior to notification, it is not viable that the
service provider will be able to carry out complex legal analyses under
the French Penal Code posing the risk of service providers
automatically granting requests, in several cases in violation of the
freedom of expression. Finally, the sanctions envisaged are so
significant that such a restriction on freedom of expression is
unconstitutional.
Austria also introduced obligations for online platforms,95 following
the German pattern. The Austrian rules, which have been in force since
January 1, 2021, apply to domestic and foreign platforms that have
more than 100,000 users in Austria or which have revenues in Austria
of more than 500,000 euro. The video content on video-sharing
platforms is governed by the rules of the Audiovisual Media Services
Act, while the Communication Platforms Act applies to the rest of their
content. The new rules require platforms to set up an effective and
transparent procedure for reporting and deleting illegal content.
Deletion must take place within twenty-four hours if the illegality is
“obvious to a legal layman,” or within seven days if a detailed
examination is necessary. There must be a complaints procedure in
place for users affected by deletion or blocking to avoid “overblocking.”
Failure to comply with these obligations may result in fines of a
maximum of ten million euro being imposed on the platform.96
Just a few months after President Trump’s ban from social media
platforms, the Florida state legislature passed a bill that would have
banned the suspension of social media accounts of candidates for public
office, subject to heavy fines. In addition, it would have allowed the
deletion of user content, its “shadowing” (hiding some user content
without deletion), or the suspension and deletion of user accounts only
subject to strict obligations.97

95. Communication
Platforms
Act,
2021
(Austria),
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_2020_1_151/ERV_2020_1_151.pdf.
96. The new legislation against Online Hate Speech—A brief overview, MGLP (Apr.
26, 2021), https://www.mglp.eu/en/the-new-legislation-against-online-hate-speech-a-briefoverview.
97. H.B.
7013,
2021
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Fl.
2021),
see
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2021/7013/BillText/Filed/PDF.
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Industry groups sued the state to overturn the Act a few days after
its governor signed it, claiming it violated those companies’ First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and that content moderation was
allowed under Section 230 CDA. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Florida granted the plaintiff’s request for a
preliminary injunction, saying that the law was “an effort to rein in
social media providers deemed too large and too liberal” and “not a
legitimate government interest.” It was also deemed discriminatory and
potentially violated the First Amendment free speech rights of Big Tech
platforms, as it did not apply to smaller platforms, or any platforms
owned by a company with a theme park in Florida. Finally, the court
stated that “the legislation does not survive strict scrutiny. Parts also
are expressly pre-empted by federal law.”98 It was clearly incompatible
with Section 230 CDA, which allows platforms to moderate content.99
The U.K. has also drafted a new law tailored to online platforms,
requiring a duty of care from platforms.100 The draft Online Safety Bill
was published on May 12, 2021.101 If enacted, the Bill would impose
duties of care on providers of online content-sharing platforms and
search engines. Ofcom, the U.K. communications authority, would
enforce compliance and its powers would include being able to fine
companies up to eighteen million pounds or ten percent of their annual
global turnover, whichever is higher, and the power to block access to
sites. Companies under the scope of the Bill would need to take “robust
action to tackle illegal abuse, including swift and effective action
against hate crimes, harassment and threats directed at individuals
and keep their promises to users about their standards.”102
“The largest and most popular social media sites (Category 1
services) [would also] need to act on content that is lawful but still
98. Netchoice, LLC et al., v. Ashley Brooke Moody et al., No. 4:21CV220-RH-MAF,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121951 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
99. Id.
100. Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and the Secretary of State
for the Home Department, Online Harms: White Paper, HM GOVERNMENT (Apr. 2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf.
101. Minister of State for Digital and Culture, Draft Online Safety Bill, HM
GOVERNMENT
(May
2021),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/985033/Draft_Online_Safety_Bill_Bookmarked.pdf.
102. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Home Office, and the Rt Hon
Oliver Dowden CBE MP, Landmark Laws to Keep Children Safe, Stop Racial Hate and
Protect
Democracy
Online
Published,
GOV.UK
(May
14,
2021),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/landmark-laws-to-keep-children-safe-stop-racialhate-and-protect-democracy-online-published.
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harmful . . . .”103 According to the U.K. Government, the Bill would also
strengthen people’s rights to freedom of expression.104 Users will have
access to effective routes of appeal if content is removed without good
reason and companies must reinstate that content if it has been
removed unfairly. Users will also be able to appeal to Ofcom. Certain
popular and powerful services (Category 1 platforms) would have
additional duties. They would be required to conduct and publish
up-to-date assessments of their impact on freedom of expression and
demonstrate that they have taken steps to mitigate any adverse effects.
Platforms would be forbidden from discriminating against particular
political viewpoints and will need to apply protection equally to a range
of political opinions, no matter their affiliation. Journalistic content on
news publishers’ websites does not fall under the scope of the Bill, and
articles by recognized news publishers shared on services covered by it
would be exempted. Large platforms would have a “statutory duty to
safeguard access to journalistic content shared on their platforms and
would be held to account by Ofcom for the arbitrary removal of this
content.”105
A Polish bill published in February 2021106 is fundamentally similar
to the Florida legislation. Under this bill, social media platforms may
not delete user content on the basis of their own policies, nor restrict
access to user accounts. They may only use these measures if the user
content violates the provisions of Polish law. In the event of content
removal, or if a user account is blocked, users must be able to file a
complaint on the web portal. The platform must respond to the
complaint within forty-eight hours. If the complaint is not upheld, the
user is also provided with a legal remedy.107
The European Commission submitted a legislative proposal, entitled
the Digital Services Act (DSA), on December 15, 2020.108 The proposal
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. John Woodhouse, Regulating Online Harms, PARLIAMENT.UK (Feb. 1, 2022)
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8743/CBP-8743.pdf.
106. Ustawa z dnia 2021 r. o ochronie wolności słowa w internetowych serwisach
społecznościowych,
https://www.gov.pl/attachment/5a0c5ba6-67cb-43af-ae38aa5dc805e14f.
107. Magdalena Gad-Nowak & Marcin S. Wnukowski, Polish Government to Pass Law
that will Allow it More Control over the Internet Content and Legitimize Blocking Access to
Certain Websites, 11 NAT. L. REV. _ (Feb. 12, 2021); Márta Benyusz & Gábor Hulkó,
Regulation of Social Media’s Public Law Liability in the Visegrad States, 1 INST. ADMIN. J.
ADMIN. SCI. 6, 11‒13 (2021).
108. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive
2000/31/EC. Brussels, 15.12.2020, COM (2020) 825 final, 2020/0361(COD).
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does not aim to alter the liability regime of platforms, as set out in the
E-commerce directive. Nevertheless, the DSA stipulates new obligations
for platforms. The obligations are:
❖

providing information to authorities based on orders;

❖

designating points of contact and legal representatives;

❖

indicating restrictions in their terms and conditions;

❖

publishing annual transparency reports;

❖

managing notices on illegal content;

❖

providing reasoning for decisions;

❖

maintaining a complaint management system;

❖

ensuring the right to turn to an out-of-court body
(out-of-court dispute settlement);

❖

processing notices on illegal content submitted by trusted
flaggers with priority;

❖

suspending of services to recipients that frequently post
manifestly illegal content;

❖

reporting suspicions of criminal offenses;

❖

publishing of more detailed transparency reports;

❖

user-facing transparency of online advertising.

The Digital Services Act also includes special obligations for “very
large online platforms” for managing systemic risks. The proposal can
be regarded as another step forward in strengthening and detailing the
liability regime established by the E-Commerce Directive.
The European regulations and proposals detailed above typically
remain within the framework of the notice-and-takedown procedure
established by the E-Commerce Directive,109 and are in line with its
principles, only going beyond it by setting out detailed rules for it.
German, Austrian, and French regulations restrict the burden on
platforms to take action against illegal content, further strengthening
their propensity to delete problematic user content. The envisaged U.K.

109. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 6.
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regulation already takes aspects of freedom of speech into account, as
does the E.U. proposal, which also seeks to provide for mandatory
external dispute resolution, procedural guarantees, and external
oversight of the platforms’ activities. The Polish proposal would go even
further and prohibit platforms from drawing up codes of freedom of
speech and enforcing them by private means. Similar bans were
contained in the defunct Florida act. There is no doubt that the freedom
of platforms must also be kept in mind when creating their regulation.
To date, all of the new rules or proposals succeeded in striking a
(fragile) balance between restricting the intervention by platforms,
protecting users’ freedom and the freedom of platforms and considering
the interests of other users who the platform wants to protect from
offensive speech.
3. Protecting Users’ Speech from Platforms: Future
Considerations
The companies running social media platforms are truly the masters
and governors of the communication that takes place on their
platforms.110 Of course, there are many other forums for publicity.
Anyone on the Internet can express themselves free or almost free of
charge, and a plethora of social media platforms are available.
However, if someone wants their published opinion to have an impact
on public affairs, there is not even a theoretical chance of achieving this
without the big platforms. Legacy media cannot be economically viable
without large social media platforms either. It has also become
apparent that the big platforms are able to move together, to take steps
at the same time that affect the exercise of freedom of speech, be it a
general action against some harmful content, or simply banning
President Trump from all platforms at the same time.111 There is
currently no viable alternative to big social media platforms in the
public sphere—expression outside these platforms may almost be seen
as a formal but ineffective expression of this right.
Of course, it is debateable whether it is incumbent on the state to do
something about this situation, and whether it can be considered part of
the constitutional protection of freedom of speech if regulation seeks to
broaden the opportunities for users to actually exercise their rights.
While there can be no recognized and protected right to use a given
platform, the European view is that the protection of freedom of speech
should not end up with public authorities unduly restricting the
110. Klonick, supra note 71.
111. Barrie Sander, Democratic Disruption in the Age of Social Media: Between
Marketized and Structural Conceptions of Human Rights Law, 32 E.J.I.L. 159, 181 (2021).
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freedom of their citizens. The European approach expects states to take
proactive steps for the effective enforcement of the freedom of speech.112
The democratization of the private regulation exercised by platforms,
making the processes involved more transparent, creating a right of
redress, and establishing external and independent oversight of the
whole process by public authorities may represent the first steps in this
direction.113 The Digital Services Act proposed by the European Union
has also clearly set off in this direction. The control over content on
platforms should be exercised through rules that take the platform
users’ freedom of speech into account. In this respect, the state and
legal regulation are not potential enemies, but important sponsors of
freedom of speech.
Platforms may be held accountable for certain human rights
standards, and aspects of content moderation in the application of
private regulation may approach international legal standards that
have evolved in the context of restrictions on freedom of speech.114 This
requires limitations on the decision–making freedom of the platforms as
well as external oversight of the decision–making process. The first step
towards this is to enforce transparency, which has been highlighted as a
priority by many commentators, bearing in mind what platforms do
with user content in general.115 In the absence of adequate information,
we can only gain a vague idea of the extent to which a platform
interferes with the exercise of freedom of speech. At the same time,
transparency is not a panacea: finding out the settings of the algorithm
used and constantly modified by the platform and revealing the
technical parameters to the public would be detrimental to the business
interests of the platform and difficult for even experts to interpret or
follow. Therefore, requiring transparency in technical terms would be
largely meaningless for public authorities or individual users.
In the current circumstances, the publicity of the platforms can only
be properly regulated through the cooperation of all stakeholders. The
legal system typically seeks to place liability for violations in a single
112. Aleksandra Kuczerawy, The Power of Positive Thinking: Intermediary Liability
and the Effective Enjoyment of the Right to Freedom of Expression, 8 JIPITEC 226 (2017).
113. Giovanni De Gregorio, Democratising Online Content Moderation: A
Constitutional Framework, 36 COMPUT. L. SEC. REV. 1 (2020).
114. Thiago D. Oliva, Content Moderation Technologies: Applying Human Rights
Standards to Protect Freedom of Expression, 20 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 607 (2020).
115. Daphne Keller & Paddy Leerssen, Facts and Where to Find Them: Empirical
Research on Internet Platforms and Content Moderation, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND
DEMOCRACY (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020); Robert Gorwa & Timothy
Garton Ash, Democratic Transparency in the Platform Society, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND
DEMOCRACY (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020).

556

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

location by clearly designating the addressee of a rule. This approach is
already being sidelined in E.U. legislation, for example, which makes it
mandatory for platforms to delete unlawful content if certain conditions
are met. Public authorities on the one hand determine what qualifies as
unlawful and impose direct liability on the infringing user, and on the
other hand monitor compliance with the obligation imposed on the
platforms. In principle, without going into detail, this system may seem
necessarily respectful of freedom of speech and democratic publicity,
but in practice it typically results in platforms deleting content that has
been flagged as unlawful, thus avoiding the hassle of thorough
investigation. The actual significance of this procedure is amplified
because the regulation does not prohibit private regulation by
platforms, so they may delete content that they consider undesirable to
a much greater extent. Content that is considered unlawful by legal
regulation in most cases also qualifies as deletable according to the
private regulation of the platform—with certain exceptions. For
example, Facebook does not ban defamatory content, while the law
does, so the notice-and-takedown procedure is often irrelevant.
However, it seems certain that the future of regulation will see the
division of legal responsibility between stakeholders by keeping in mind
the cooperative responsibility.116 Users must be directly responsible for
the content they make accessible, and the platform must respect both
the user’s freedom of speech and the interests of the democratic public.
Platforms must accept that media-like businesses that are assigned
social responsibility need to strengthen the freedom of discourse on the
Internet.117
In recent years there have been several regulatory attempts to
provide answers to problems raised in connection with the operation of
platforms. The German, Austrian, or French forms of regulation
introduced above increase the existing burden on platforms, reinforcing
the need for management of content and its deletion where necessary.
This may seem to be an adequate response to the social tensions
experienced in those states, but it has the effect of further restricting
the enforcement of freedom of speech while indirectly strengthening the
legitimacy of the private regulation of platforms. In the meantime,
Facebook has already pre-emptively set up a body that it presumably
hopes will dampen governments’ regulatory zeal. Facebook’s recently
created self-regulatory mechanism oversees its own operation by setting
up a supervisory body independent of the platform, the state, and other
116. Natali Helberger et. al., Governing Online Platforms: From Contested to
Cooperative Responsibility, 34 INFO. SOC’Y. 1, 1–8 (2018).
117. Balkin, supra note 69, at 1209.
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industry players alike.118 This Oversight Board, previously referred to
by Mark Zuckerberg as the “Supreme Court of Facebook,” is not
intended to serve as an appeal forum for individual cases but as a body
that sets general benchmarks for freedom of expression.119 An essential
element of self-regulation is the separable nature of the regulated and
the regulator: the Oversight Board (the regulator) will therefore be
considered self-regulatory if Facebook (the regulated) actually submits
itself to its decisions. On the other hand, the Oversight Board may be
considered to be private regulation, as its activities affect the freedom of
expression of the platform users. The rules of operation of the Board are
established by Facebook; its members are appointed by Facebook; and
its competence extends exclusively to the Facebook platform, which all
undermine its independence. The establishment of the Oversight Board
is another step towards the strengthening of the private regulation that
has been developing in parallel with the legal system.
Settling the relationship between legal and private regulation would
require a clear distinction between unlawful content and that which is
merely harmful. While all unlawful content is harmful, provided that
the ban on it complies with democratic standards, harmful, damaging
content is not necessarily unlawful. At present, regulation in Europe
tolerates, and in some cases even supports, platforms taking action
against not-unlawful but harmful content, for example, in the case of
action against fake news. In the meantime, it has not attempted to set
clear criteria to prevent interference with the exercise of freedom of
speech from being arbitrary.120 The nature of harmful content is not
determined by democratic procedures. Instead, the platforms decide
what they consider to be harmful.121 The Florida experiment presented
above and the Polish bill represent a step in the direction of pushing
back against private regulation. The intention behind such initiatives is
to be welcomed, even if the experiments themselves are far from
perfect. The Polish bill aims to make private codes compiled by
platforms irrelevant, with platforms only authorized to remove content
that is prohibited by the legal system, namely unlawful content. This
would expect the platforms’ moderators and algorithms to become
familiar with the country’s freedom of speech legislation, which is
118. Makena Kelly, Facebook’s Oversight Board will Include a Former Prime Minister
and
Nobel
Prize
Winner,
THE
VERGE
(May
6,
2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/6/21249427/facebook-oversight-board-nobel-peace-prizeinstagram-snowden.
119. Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution
to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L. J. 2232 (2020).
120. Sander, supra note 111, at 179.
121. Helberger, supra note 116, at 8.
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undoubtedly more difficult than enforcing worldwide private regulation
that uses rules created by the platform. The Polish solution may not be
operable (no guarantees would exist even at the European level, given
the varying restrictions on freedom of speech) although its underlying
principle may be attractive to friends of freedom of speech.
C. The Possible Application of the Public Forum Doctrine
The well-established public forum doctrine has enshrined the right to
use certain physical spaces used by the community for the purposes of
exercising freedom of speech. That right presupposes the existence of
community fora where that freedom may be exercised. According to the
case law of the Supreme Court of the United States, freedom of speech
can, to some extent, be exercised in the new public fora. However, this
practice is not fully uniform and recognizes the right to freedom of
speech in the new public fora only subject to strict restrictions. In
Marsh v. Alabama,122 a factory banned the distribution of flyers in its
own “town,” built to accommodate its own workers, and the Court found
this restriction unconstitutional. Based on the findings of the judgment
delivered in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,123 freedom of speech
may also be exercised in a private shopping mall with certain
restrictions, as long as it made clear that the opinion expressed is not
that of the owner of that institution. This right obviously does not
include the organization of gatherings in the building, for example. In
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee124 the Court
ruled that although a privately-owned airport is not a public forum,
distribution of flyers is allowed on its territory. However, addressing
people with a view to raising donations is not.
European legal systems also guarantee the freedom of streets and
spaces for the purpose of assembly and free speech, but in general
privately owned buildings and real estate cannot be taken over for the
purpose of exercising freedom of speech. In Appleby v. the United
Kingdom,125 the applicant stated that the owner of a private shopping
mall had violated his rights by not consenting to the installation of a
table and a podium in the building to collect signatures and distribute
leaflets (the protest would have targeted construction works in a town
park). The European Court of Human Rights held there was no
violation of freedom of speech and right of assembly on the side of the
state. Even so, large shopping malls can hardly be regarded as entirely
122.
123.
124.
125.

326 U.S. 501 (1946).
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
505 U.S. 672 (1992).
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private institutions with regard to the exercise of freedom of speech, so
it may be justified to ensure this right can be exercised on their
premises to some extent. The general European interpretation of
freedom of assembly and speech holds that only state-owned and local
government-owned areas may be used to exercise these rights. The total
exclusion of privately owned properties from this circle limits a
significant amount of speech and its effectiveness, as well as being
potentially discriminatory since the owner can freely decide who can
enter the area and who is excluded from it. In this way, the protection
of private interests may be contrary to the public interest.126
Social media platforms do not exist in a physical space and the
service is privately owned by the company providing it, yet they are
used by millions of people on a daily basis for the purpose of exchanging
information and expressing opinions. Social media platforms may also
be used to commit criminal offenses. In this context, it is an interesting
question whether certain users may be banned from such platforms on
the basis of crime prevention considerations. Sex offenders constitute a
group of particular importance, as they can easily contact minors via
the platforms. John Hitz argues that a general ban on those convicted of
such offences (following the enforcement of their punishment) would be
inconsistent with freedom of speech.127 Once rehabilitated, sex offenders
may exercise their freedom of speech without any restriction.128
According to U.S. doctrine, banning such persons from commonly used
platforms (not only those exclusively used by minors) would constitute a
content-neutral restriction on speech that is not tailored narrowly
enough.129
This very issue was considered by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Packingham v. North Carolina,130 which is the second most
important decision on the freedom of online speech since Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union131 twenty years earlier. Justice
Kennedy, drafter of the majority opinion, described the Internet as the
“modern public square,” where members of the public exchange
opinions.132 While the lower court considered the law of North Carolina

126. Jacob Rowbottom, Property and Participation: A Right of Access for Expressive
Activities, 2 EHRLR 186 (2005).
127. John Hitz, Removing Disfavored Faces from Facebook: The Freedom of Speech
Implications of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Media, 89 IND. L. J. 1327 (2014).
128. Id. at 1341.
129. Id. at 1349–56.
130. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
131. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
132. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
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as a restriction on action but not on speech, and consequently applied a
less stringent standard. The Court disagreed and changed the ruling, as
its restriction on speech was not of a narrowly tailored character.133
By comparing the Internet to a physical space, Justice Kennedy
raised the issue of whether the public forum doctrine could be applied
with regard to the Internet. U.S. law distinguishes three different kinds
of public forums, each of which is subject to different standards
concerning the limitation of speech. The first kind includes traditional
public forums (public squares, streets, and parks), where the exercise of
the freedom of speech is customary. The second kind includes
designated or limited public forums, which are traditional but
specifically designated places for exercising the freedom of speech (for
example, conference halls that can be used with the permission of their
owner or manager). The third kind of public forum includes non-public
forums that do not serve as a place where anyone can speak but where
speech takes place nonetheless (such as hospitals, prisons, and military
bases).134 More and more restrictions on free speech may be applied to
the different kinds of public forums, proceeding from the first to the
third category.
In his concurring opinion to the Packingham judgment, Justice Alito
suggested that the Court might be wrong to compare the Internet per se
to streets and public parks.135 The comparison may be valid regarding
social media platforms used by government organs and bodies, but most
of the communication and exchange of ideas conducted through such
platforms is private in nature,136 meaning that the doctrine of public
forums cannot be applied, and the platforms in general, as well as their
individual users (regarding their own profile), are free to adopt their
own rules of speech. According to this approach, user access to such
platforms may not be prohibited by the government using legal means.
However, the service provider may certainly do so without any
limitation, with possible exceptions when applying anti-discrimination
rules. This approach may be challenged in that it allows a platform to
act as a kind of government in itself, meaning that the freedom of
speech should also be guaranteed with regard to the restrictive
practices of the platform.137 However, such requirements would come
close to challenging the ownership rights of the platforms themselves.

133. Id. at 1736–38.
134. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1980–92 (2011).
135. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1743.
136. First Amendment-Freedom of Speech-Public Forum Doctrine-Packingham v.
North Carolina, 131 HARV. L. REV. 233, 238 (2017).
137. Klonick, supra note 71, at 1609.
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According to the traditional approach to freedom of speech, a social
media platform is similar to a privately-owned shopping center, in that
its owner or operator can ban or remove any person from the premises if
the rules of using the property as determined by the owner have been
violated.138 This might result in a situation where services that once
promised to facilitate the exercise of individual freedoms enter into
deals with oppressive regimes in the hope of business advantages.139
Social media platforms are also used by public institutions and
officials to provide information, collect opinions, and so forth, and the
public profile of a politician or a local government may be subject to
different rules than those of private users. Former President Donald
Trump was a prominent user of Twitter, where he used to block those
users who posted critical comments under his tweets. The question is
whether he (or the actual manager of his account) could prohibit others
from reading his messages (that is, “following” him), as numerous U.S.
citizens have experienced. According to the dominant approach, the
public forum doctrine may not be applied concerning the relationship
between Twitter and its users, but it may be applied concerning the
relationship between two users, in particular if one of them is an
elected public official. In other words, an area of a social media platform
may be considered a public forum if it is used for public political
communication.140
This approach was illustrated by a district court in Knight First
Amendment Institute v. Trump.141 Numerous plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
against the former President and the White House staffer managing his
Twitter account because they had been banned from following that
account. As a result of the ban, they could not have direct access to and
comment on the former President’s tweets. Nor could they read the
related comments. They could only learn about communications made
by the former President through comments made by their contacts.
After analyzing the applicability of the public forum doctrine, the court
ruled that the former President’s account was a designated or limited
forum from which a person whose speech did not cross the limits of the
freedom of speech could not be banned (the plaintiffs were banned
because of their tweets that disputed the content of the presidential

138. Facebook is not the Public Square, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/opinion/facebook-is-not-the-public-square.html.
139. Mike Isaac, Facebook Said to Create Censorship Tool to Get Back into China, THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
22,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/technology/facebook-censorship-tool-china.html.
140. Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1994–2002.
141. 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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tweets).142 The White House is not the owner of the service, not even in
the context of the single Trump account concerned, but the account is
operated under its control and supervision, which is enough to consider
it a public forum.143 The restriction of political opinions is unacceptable
in such a forum144 (meaning, a contrario, that even a political figure
might be banned from the service if he or she crosses the limits of free
speech).
The second-instance judgment in this case145 confirmed the
first-instance decision that the former President could not block users
who criticized or mocked his policy from following his own Twitter
account. The President’s Twitter account is a public forum, and its
manager may not restrict access to those who post opinions on it that
are not otherwise unlawful or violate the provisions binding the users of
the platform.
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated this ruling, as
Trump was no longer president, and in January 2021 Twitter
permanently suspended his account.146 Although the decision was
expected, the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas raises important
points.
Respondents have a point, for example, that some aspects of Mr.
Trump’s account resemble a constitutionally protected public forum.
But it seems rather odd to say that something is a government forum
when a private company has unrestricted authority to do away with
it. The disparity between Twitter’s control and Mr. Trump’s control is
stark, to say the least. Mr. Trump blocked several people from
interacting with his messages. Twitter barred Mr. Trump not only
from interacting with a few users, but removed him from the entire
platform, thus barring all Twitter users from interacting with his
messages. 147

Justice Thomas’s suggestion is valid and, in the light of subsequent
events, as well as President Trump’s ban from the platform,148 it is

142. Id. at 572–73.
143. Id. at 565–69.
144. Id. at 575–76.
145. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2nd
Cir. 2019).
146. Biden v. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220
(2021).
147. Id. at 2.
148. Kate Conger and Mike Isaac, Twitter Permanently Bans Trump, Capping Online
Revolt,
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(Jan.
8,
2021).
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/technology/twitter-trump-suspended.html.
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difficult to argue that the account of a political actor constitutes a public
forum if the platform was able to treat it without restrictions or even
close it down. This possibility, of course, existed even before the
President was banned; in that sense, Justice Thomas’s suggestion was
not linked to specific events. Moreover, instead of considering the
platforms as public forums, Justice Thomas raised the applicability of
the category of “places of public accommodation.” In other words, the
idea that platforms are public places which provide publicly accessible
services. The doctrine of these services may restrict the platform’s right
to terminate the provision of the service unilaterally.149
An appellate court ruled similarly to the Knight judgment in Davison
v. Randall,150 noting that the official Facebook page operated by the
defendant, the chairman of a county school council, is a public forum.
The deletion of the plaintiff’s critical comments was an impermissible
restriction of his freedom of speech, which constituted discrimination on
the basis of point of view, and thus the defendant had violated a
constitutional right. However, the platform as a whole is not a public
forum, and its provider is not a public actor which must ensure equal
access to the platform it owns. The deletion of the Facebook account of
Russian trolls by the service provider does not therefore constitute a
restriction of freedom of speech. Section 230 of the CDA or its contract
with users does not restrict the platform provider from taking action
against content that is incompatible with its policy but not necessarily
unlawful.151
If large social media platforms are considered public fora from a legal
point of view, it would open the gates to wider restrictions on their
operation. Knowing the role they play in publicity and their de facto
unavoidable nature, this does not seem unthinkable.152 This would
allow private regulation by platforms to be prohibited, while the
restrictions on freedom of speech would remain applicable. However,
declaring them to be public fora would require a significant
reinterpretation of the doctrine, and interference with the exercise of
the right to private property to an extent that would hardly be

149. Id.
150. 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
151. Federal Agency of News LLC, et al. v. Facebook, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (N.D.
Cal. 2020).
152. Trevor Puetz, Facebook: The New Town Square, 44 S.W. L. REV. 385 (2014).
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compatible with the currently prevailing conception of the First
Amendment.153
D. The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights—The German Example
The doctrine of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights is capable
of protecting the user vis-à-vis the platform, in their contractual
relationship. The roots of this doctrine are in Europe.
The [German] doctrine of third party effect (Drittwirkung)
instantiates the idea that the (economic) constitution entails legal
obligations on private law interactions of private persons in their
relationships inter se . . . . Drittwirkung (third party effect) may be
direct or indirect . . . . Horizontal direct effect is the application of
public law rules to directly affect legal relations between private
individuals in their relations with other private law persons.154

The U.S. legal system calls this “state action doctrine” rather than
“horizontal effect,” where the law obligates private parties to respect
the constitutional rights of others.155 With regard to online platforms,
intervention in the relationship between a platform and a user would
not fit into the U.S. legal system.156
A private law approach to platforms and their users may be more
expedient than contemplating strict state regulation of platforms.
Applying the doctrine of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights
could help to restore the imbalance between the platform and the user,
forcing platforms to take their users’ right to freedom of speech into
account in their decisions. This does not require legal authorization
either. Courts may apply this approach in legal disputes, provided that
this is not contrary to the traditions, practices, and principles of the
legal system they operate in.
Two recent German cases clearly show the contradictions and
ambiguity which arise when applying the constitutional free speech
doctrines to a contractual relationship between a social media platform
153. Matthew P. Hooker, Censorship, Free Speech & Facebook: Applying the First
Amendment to Social Media Platforms via the Public Function Exception, 15 WASH. J. L.
TECH. & ARTS 36 (2019).
154. Eric Engle, Third-Party Effect of Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung), 5 HANSE L.
REV. 165 (2009); see Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 79 (2003).
155. Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public/Private Distinction, and the
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329 (1993).
156. Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” AND State Action: The First
Amendment’s Application—or Lack Thereof—to Third-Party Platforms, 32 BERKLEY TECH
L.J. 989 (2017).
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and its user. In Themel v. Facebook Ireland, Inc.,157 the Higher Regional
Court in Munich, Germany, held that the deletion of the plaintiff’s
comment by Facebook constituted a breach of contract, as the platform
was required to respect her right to freedom of expression under Article
5 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz).158 The facts of the case
were that on August 7, 2018, Spiegel-Online, a German news website,
posted an article on its Facebook page entitled “Austria announces
border controls.” There was a harsh debate in the comments under the
Facebook post, and Heike Themel, a German politician and member of
the right-wing AfD Party, was referred to as a “Nazi-slut.” She
responded to that comment, quoting a German poem: “I can’t compete
in an argument with you. You are unarmed and this wouldn’t be very
fair from my side.” Facebook deleted the comment and suspended her
account for thirty days. This decision was based on Facebook’s
Community Standards, rule 5.2, which prohibits hate speech on the
platform. After she approached the court, it held that the application of
rule 5.2 violated Section 241(2) of the German Civil Code,159 which says
that “[a contractual] obligation may also, depending on its contents,
oblige each party to take account of the rights, legal interests and other
interests of the other party.”160 As the Community Standards give
Facebook the power to decide on its own which posts or comments
violate its rules, the court noted that this power contradicts the Civil
Code’s requirement. The court emphasised that Facebook as a social
media platform provides a “public marketplace” for an exchange of
views and opinions, and that legally permissible expressions cannot be
deleted from the platform. As Heike Themel’s comment did not
constitute hate speech, Facebook’s deletion of the comment and
suspension of Themel’s account was unlawful.
In another German case, User v. Facebook Ireland, Inc.,161 the
Regional Court in Heidelberg, Germany, arrived at the completely
opposite conclusion. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that her
right to freedom of expression had been infringed. Prior to the decision,
in July 2018, a Facebook user commented below a post concerning
integration of migrants in Germany: “[r]espect! That is the keyword!
Fundamentalist Muslims regard us as soft grown heathens,

157. Themel v. Facebook Ireland, Inc., 18 W. 1294/18, 24 August 2018, Higher
Regional Court Munich, Germany.
158. German Constitution, Art. 5 (2012).
159. German Civil Code BGB § 241(2).
160. Id.
161. User v. Facebook Ireland, Inc., 1O 71/18, 28 August 2018, Regional Court in
Heidelberg, Germany.
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pig-gluttons and our women as whores. They do not respect us.” On
July 16, 2018, Facebook deleted the user’s comment and blocked her
profile for 30 days. After Facebook refused to reverse its decision, the
plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction before the Regional Court in
Heidelberg. The central issues before the court were whether Facebook
was entitled to remove the post and block the user, and whether
Facebook’s Community Standards were consistent with Section 307 of
the Civil Code, which says in its Paragraph 1 that provisions in
standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to the requirement
of good faith, they unreasonably disadvantage the other party to the
contract with the user. An unreasonable disadvantage may also arise
from the provision not being clear and comprehensible.
The court noted that Facebook’s standards list the types of
expression that are not protected and define the boundaries of what can
be considered restricted speech. In addition, the rules indicate the kind
of consequences each user faces if he or she violates these standards.
Accordingly, the court held that the standards cannot be considered
non-transparent, and they did not discriminate against users
inappropriately. As a conclusion, the court found that Facebook’s rules
adequately take into consideration the right to freedom of expression
and that, even though aggressive opinions or extreme expressions are
protected under the Constitution, Facebook as a private party does not
have to grant its users the full right to freedom of expression that is
provided by the state in the constitutional context.162
These two decisions take two different paths. The latter decision fits
into the usually applied legal framework, which—through the
recognition of the platform’s property and free speech rights—allows
Facebook to delete more or less any users’ content it finds
inappropriate. The former one aims to restrict the platform’s powers in
this regard. The decisions depict the possible strengths and weaknesses
of mandating the law of contracts to resolve free speech issues arising
between private parties.
In other cases, German courts have also ruled that platforms are not
allowed to delete lawful and protected opinions, in view of the
horizontal effect of fundamental rights.163 Under the German
constitution, the state has a duty to ensure the freedom of speech for its
citizens, even at the expense of private parties (platforms). Although

162. See Colombia Global Freedom of Expression, User v. Facebook Ireland, Inc.,
COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY
(Aug.
28,
2018),
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/user-v-facebook-ireland-inc.
163. Matthias C. Kettemann & Anna S. Tiedeke, Back Up: Can Users Sue Platforms to
Reinstate Deleted Content?, 9 INTERNT POL’Y. REV. 1, 10 (2020).
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the contract between the platform and the user may allow the former to
restrict the freedom of speech, the German courts consider that these
provisions are void if they put the user into a significantly
disadvantaged position by violating the principle of good faith in private
law.164
The German Constitutional Court has also heard a case wherein the
applicant asked the court to restore a comment he posted that had been
deleted by the platform as hate speech and to reactivate his account,
which had been suspended at the same time. The court started from the
provision of the Basic Law according to which “[a]ll persons shall be
equal before the law.” 165 According to the court’s decision: “[u]nder
specific circumstances, Article 3(1) of the Basic Law may give rise to
requirements pertaining to the right to equality in the context of
relationships between private actors.”166 The court in its reasoning
performed a weighing of the disadvantages for the involved parties, and
found that the consequences that would occur if the interim injunction
was not issued but the main proceedings—on whether the given content
can be deleted or not by the platform—were successful would outweigh
the disadvantages that would arise if the interim injunction was issued,
but the main proceedings proved to be unfounded. Therefore, it granted
the preliminary injunction. In this way, the court ordered a temporary
delay, but set an example of how—besides private law—constitutional
equal rights protection may also be used to limit the power of online
platforms.
Given the key role of social media platforms in public
communication, it would not be completely alien to the European
approach to view them as service providers, which would open the door
to the recognition of horizontal effect.167 In any case, the draft E.U.
Digital Services Act also contains a number of provisions that limit the
possible content of the contract between the platform and the user, with
a view to protect the user’s interests. Such a requirement would involve
an obligation for the platform to justify its decisions made on user
content, to operate a complaint handling mechanism, and for the
contract to provide for the right to independent out-of-court dispute
resolution.

164. Id. at 10–11; see German Civil Code, [BGB] § 307.
165. Second Chamber of the First Senate, Order of 22 May 2019, 1 BvQ 42/19.
166. Id.
167. Giovanni De Gregorio, From Constitutional Freedoms to the Power of the
Platforms: Protecting Fundamental Rights Online in the Algorithmic Society, 11 EUR. J.
LEGAL STUD. 65, 101 (2019).
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Nicolas Suzor calls efforts to protect users’ rights “digital
constitutionality,”168 and he approaches it not from the perspective of
private law and contract law but suggests the application of certain
principles of the “rule of law” to the relationship between the platform
and the user, such as by applying the criteria of it being consensual,
transparent, equally applied, and relatively stable. The aim of digital
constitutionality is to revisit how private governance can be limited,169
and the result may be similar to if it were approached from a private
law perspective: a restriction on the platform’s freedom of choice,
aiming to protect the user’s freedom of speech.
IV. POTENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS TO PROTECT
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The European notion of freedom of the press maintains that the
media have “duties and responsibilities” in the course of exercising this
freedom. This wording is included in two documents that play an
important role at the international level in the interpretation of
freedom of speech and the press: The European Convention on Human
Rights (Article 10(2)) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Article 19(3)), which also applies outside the
community of European states. Nevertheless, the European court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), which enforces compliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights, clearly interprets these duties in relation
to the press,170 and it does not emphasize them in the case of individual
speakers.171 These duties and responsibilities are applied towards
democratic publicity, and it is the media’s duty to report on important
issues of public interest and to respect the rights of others. However,
the former is mostly mere rhetoric, as the media in Europe do not have
a general duty to serve the public interest and are free to report on
what they want, or to ignore any event or opinion, so it is possible to
establish a newspaper, to operate a television channel or to
communicate perfectly non-political tabloid news on any topic.
However, with regard to media services such as television, radio, and,
to a lesser extent, on-demand media services, European (national)

168. Nicolas Suzor, Digital Constitutionalism: Using the Rule of Law to Evaluate the
Legitimacy of Governance by Platforms, 4 SOC. MEDIA + SOC’Y. 1 (2018).
169. Id. at 4.
170. Eur. Ct. H.R. Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 2), No. 13166/87,
judgment of 26 November 1991; The Observer and Guardian v. The United Kingdom, No.
13585/88, judgment of 26 November 1991; Jersild v. Denmark, No. 15890/89, judgment of
September 23, 1994 [GC].
171. JAN OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 36 (2015).
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regulations may, if certain conditions are met, impose obligations to
provide citizens with adequate information. These rules are mostly
absent from the U.S. legal system. Nevertheless, the application of the
principles that underlie the rules intended to protect the public interest
to social media platforms may be worth reconsidering.
A. The Social Media as “Media”
Large Internet gatekeepers usually consider themselves tech
companies.172 It is in their best interests to do so for two reasons. First,
the regulations applicable to technology companies are far narrower
and less stringent than those applicable to media companies (which are
also subject to content regulation, special restrictions on competition,
the prohibition of concentration, and the obligation to perform public
interest tasks). Second, the moral requirement of social responsibility is
far less frequently mentioned concerning the activities of tech
companies. However, the legal classification of a given service does not
derive from the self-image of the service provider but from the nature of
its activities. For this reason, some of the gatekeepers, primarily the
social media platforms, can be considered media undertakings.173
Previously, Facebook insisted that its service is nothing but a neutral
platform, and the company does not have anything to do with how or for
what purpose it is used by users.174 Discussions conducted through the
platform may improve participation in elections, but the service itself
does not influence the outcome of elections in any way.175 It is more like
a billboard: anybody can sign or display anything on it. In light of the
events that unfolded in recent years, this position does not seem easy to
maintain any longer. It was revealed in the Spring of 2016 that
Facebook’s Trending Topics service distorts the significance of certain
pieces of news on a political basis, so that some content was presented
as if it were more or less important than it actually was. The distortion
172. Ashley Rodriguez, Zuckerberg Says Facebook will Never be a Media Company—
Despite
Controlling
the
World’s
Media,
QUARTZ
(Sept.
1,
2016),
https://qz.com/770743/zuckerberg-says-facebook-will-never-be-a-media-company-despitecontrolling-the-worlds-media.
173. Charles Warner, Fake News: Facebook is a Technology Company, FORBES (Nov.
27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/charleswarner/2016/11/27/fake-news-facebook-is-atechnology-company/#7b65816e1381.
174. Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, Inside the Two Years That Shook
Facebook—And the World, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/insidefacebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell.
175. Alexis C. Madrigal, The False Dream of a Neutral Facebook, THE ATLANTIC (Sept.
28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/09/the-false-dream-of-aneutral-facebook/541404.
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was deliberate and implemented manually, that is, not caused by a
possibly miscalibrated algorithm.176 After the U.S. presidential election
of 2016, the platform was widely accused of not having done anything to
prevent the spread of false news, thereby contributing to the victory of
Trump and the defeat of Hillary Clinton.177 Around the same time, a
“fake news factory” was discovered in Macedonia,178 followed by news of
meddling in social media by Russian intelligence services, sparking
endless investigations.179
Compounded by the scandal concerning Cambridge Analytica in 2018
(which also touched upon the debate on the protection of users’ personal
data),180 Facebook could not deflect these accusations by disclaiming
any responsibility for its users, and it could not claim to remain neutral
any longer. By 2018, the platform realized that similar to the media and
other publishers, it bears responsibility toward the public for the state
of democracy.181 It is another issue how a series of such problems could
be handled (if they can be handled at all), considering that the platform
was designed to rapidly provide a wide audience to all statements,
including false ones. It should be noted here that Facebook was not a
neutral platform even before 2016. Its algorithms produce a
personalized news feed for each and every user, using settings that are
dependent on but not entirely under the control of the user concerned.
Naturally, the news feed settings serve the business interests of the
platform, which are legitimate interests but unlikely to foster any
neutral behaviour.
Philip Napoli and Robyn Caplan offer a summary of the questions
that arise in this field. The authors argue that, considering their main
activities, large online gatekeepers should no longer be considered tech
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Documents
Show,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
12,
2016)
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/12/facebook-trending-news-leakeddocuments-editor-guidelines.
177. Antonio G. Martínez, How Trump Conquered Facebook—Without Russian Ads,
WIRED
(Feb.
23,
2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/how-trump-conqueredfacebookwithout-russian-ads.
178. Samanth Subramanian, Welcome to Veles, Macedonia, Fake News Factory to the
World, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fakenews.
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companies.182 The identity of these companies is based on the argument
that they do not produce any content themselves but merely facilitate
the publication of content created by their users (social media), or
provide links to such content upon request by a user (search engines).
This may be true, but Napoli and Caplan identified a number of
features that make the operation of such companies quite similar to
that of the media. From the perspective of the public sphere, the
distribution of content is also of great importance, in addition to that of
content creation, and such activities used to form part of the activities
of media companies before the emergence of the Internet. These
companies employ human workers, either to make certain editorial
decisions or to configure the algorithms that make such decisions
automatically, and such editorial decision-making is an essential part of
their services. Similar to legacy media, the services of these companies
seek to provide the members of their audience (their users) with
whatever they want to see, meaning that they may not be considered
neutral platforms. Last but not least, the main source of income of these
companies is advertising—just like the media.183 The operators of the
most influential online platforms—such as Facebook and Google—are
considered media companies by legal scholars (even if not by existing
legal doctrine).184
B. The Free Speech of the Platforms
It seems clear now that platform providers are similar to traditional
media in terms of making editorial decisions, and therefore they have a
right to free speech by way of selecting and sorting pieces of content
(including giving their users power to influence these decisions
according to their own preferences). In a sense, users’ individual news
feeds, as edited by the platforms’ algorithm, are Facebook’s opinions on
what its users might be most interested in and how the platform’s
business interests could be best served in that context. “With the
curated production of news stories, editorial control is no doubt
exercised, and thus the controller of the algorithm would be a
publisher.”185 If a platform has an opinion, it is afforded protection

182. Philip M Napoli & Robyn Caplan, Why Media Companies Insist They’re Not
Media Companies, Why They’re Wrong, and Why it Matters, FIRST MONDAY (Apr. 13,
2017), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7051/6124.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Jack M Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulations, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 2296, 2304 (2014).
185. Id. at 1373. On content selection by algorithms as speech, see Benjamin, supra
note 30; Benjamin, supra note 37.
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under the constitutional rules, but it may also be subject to restriction,
pursuant to applicable legal principles.
As noted throughout this paper, the activities social media platforms
carry out concerning the user content they manage is not neutral.
Either because they seek to comply with legal regulations or since they
act on their own initiative, the operators of these platforms carry out a
kind of editorial task that involves the assessment and evaluation of
such content. The private regulation implemented by platforms is not
value-neutral either, as it clearly reflects their objective to
accommodate as many users as possible. This objective is not always
compatible with the goal of acting as a robust defender of free speech.
Moreover, through this private regulation and the necessary
prioritization of various user content, platforms exercise real
opinion-forming power, the dimensions of which have never before been
experienced in the public sphere.186
Social media platforms usually seem to be the champions of free
speech. But, as Bernal notes, “in practice free speech is just a tool for
them. They will champion it when it suits them and not champion it
when it does not.”187 Facebook is often compared to a nation state.188
Even though social media platforms have far more extensive ways of
modeling private regulation than a nation state, the analogy applies in
that nation states are neutral from a religious or philosophical point of
view, but they are not value-neutral. A social media platform can also
make value-based decisions and could ban hateful people from its
system. If we accept the public sphere to be a fundamental institution
(it would be difficult not to do so), surrendering ideological neutrality
and embracing bias would lead to serious problems, even though it
cannot be prohibited using the currently available legal and regulatory
means. However, Western countries are democracies, meaning that the
limits of free speech—among other things—are set out and made in
compliance with the rules as supervised by elected officials, courts, and
other authorities operating within a framework of constitutional
safeguards and guarantees. If a social media platform were a state, it
most certainly would not be a democracy.
According to the (hardly surprising) findings of a survey, the owners
and executives of U.S. tech companies established in Silicon Valley hold
liberal, cosmopolitan, and globalist political views and support the

186. Natali Helberger, The Political Power of Platforms: How Current Attempts to
Regulate Misinformation Amplify Opinion Power, 8 DIGIT. JOURNALISM 842 (2020).
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TRUTH 127 (2018).
188. Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. LAW. REV. 1807 (2012).
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extension of human rights—in all matters that do not interfere with
their business interests. However, they are against government
regulation in general, and labor and employment policies in particular,
on which matters they tend to agree with conservative libertarians.189
With regard to Facebook, signs of ideological bias also exist. The
manifesto published by Mark Zuckerberg in 2017 clearly reflects a
political agenda (albeit a rather naive one, considering the chances of
its implementation) to build a global community above and beyond
nation states.190 The wording goes beyond the goal of providing a safe
space and envisages the abandonment of the concept of nation states.
Naturally, this idea is not new in the era of globalization, but, reading
between the lines, one might find the objective of surpassing “national”
societies an aim that is still somewhat surprising in the age of world
trade, international organizations, and an increasingly united Europe.
It became clear during several scandals in the previous years (see
later) that Facebook is capable of exerting direct political influence,
even without any noble cause or a publicly acknowledged ideological
stance. The owners and executives of social media platforms can
exercise their freedom of speech, including making decisions concerning
the infrastructure they own. But a platform can also be harmful to
democratic public life if it grows really large but fails to manage debates
conducted on the platform with due regard to the notion of the
marketplace of ideas, that is if it attempts to influence such exchanges
using obscure means that lack transparency. However, even those
arguing that the selection of user content by platform algorithms
constitutes speech in itself acknowledge that the regulation of platform
algorithms for this selection is not prohibited by the constitutional rules
of freedom of speech.191
C. Platform Regulation in the Interest of the Public
1. The Problem of Content Diversity
The removal of undesirable content is not the only means of
implementing private regulation. A far more powerful means is the
editing and sorting of content presented to individual users, as well as
189. Farhad Manjoo, Silicon Valley’s Politics: Liberal, With One Big Exception, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/siliconvalley-politics.html.
190. Mark
Zuckerberg,
Building
a
Global
Community,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-globalcommunity/10154544292806634.
191. Sofia Grafanaki, Platforms, the First Amendment and Online Speech: Regulating
the Filters, 39 PACE L. REV. 111 (2018).
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the promotion and suppression of certain pieces of content
(“prioritization” by the platform), the impact of which is not limited to
individual pieces of content but to the entire flow of content on the
platform. This measure enables a platform to increase the popularity
and impact of highly visible content, while marginalizing and limiting
the impact of other content. The social media companies decide what is
available to whom and on what basis. “Changes in the prominence
regime could be used to manipulate media,”192 and this signifies a
threat to freedom of expression. Down-ranking (referred to by a telling
euphemism as “curation”) of speech that is otherwise relevant for public
deliberation is an extremely dangerous tool in the hands of social media
platforms.193 All of this is done with the aim of providing personalized
services and serving individual user needs (as guessed by the platform),
relying on information collected about each and every user, their
previous online presence, and their platform-generated profile. Thus,
each user unknowingly, and indeed without explicit consent, influences
the content of the service he or she receives, while the platform actively
exerts an influence over the user’s intentions and is capable of
influencing the user. The resulting consequences have an impact on the
decisions users make as consumers, and also on the discussion of public
affairs, access to information, and the diversity of opinion—in other
words, the quality of the democratic public sphere.
The real power of a platform to influence the discussion of public
affairs is not rooted in the capacity to remove individual pieces of
content or ban users. Platforms use algorithms that enable them, on the
basis of data collected about each user, to personalize each and every
piece of content accessible to and consumed by their users. An obvious
example is Facebook’s newsfeed, which includes only a small portion of
all content published by a user’s acquaintances and the pages he or she
follows. Obviously, this practice is also justified by practical
considerations, since the platform serves its users by keeping the
content available to them organized in some way and by showing them
the content in which they are most likely to be interested. However, we
do not exactly know the basis on which the platform relies when sorting
such content, how it tries to find an appropriate balance between public
192. Eleonora M. Mazzoli & Damian Tambini, Prioritisation Uncovered: The
Discoverability of Public Interest Content Online, COUNCIL OF EUROPE STUDY DGI (Nov.
2020) 19, 42 https://rm.coe.int/publication-content-prioritisation-report/1680a07a57.
193. Sarah C. Haan, Facebook and Politicians’ Speech, 70 AM. U. LAW REV. F. 203
(2021). The presence of similar recommendation systems on other online platforms should
also be noted, see the example of music streaming platforms: Tamás Tófalvy & Júlia
Koltai, “Splendid Isolation”: The Reproduction of Music Industry Inequalities in Spotify’s
Recommendation System, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y. 1 (2021).
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issues and holiday photos, and what the business interests are or could
be behind featuring certain specific pieces of content. It should be noted
that not all social media platforms edit user content as comprehensively
as Facebook, but each platform attempts to show pieces from all
potentially available content to a user that is most likely to meet his or
her interests.
An issue that arises in relation to the compilation of a news feed and
the pieces of content shown to a user in general is whether it can be
considered as protected speech by the platform. While such an
argument would seem difficult to maintain in the context of filtering
and removing content, it could be possible that the compilation of a
news feed does eventually produce some kind of content that is new and
did not exist before, the individual components of which were not
produced or commissioned by the platform, but where the work of
compilation was indeed performed by the platform according to its own
decisions and considerations. On the one hand, if such a compilation is
protected under the freedom of speech, it would be difficult to influence
it from the outside. On the other hand, if the compilation is considered
similar to the editing activities of the traditional media, it might be
possible to apply the rules and doctrines of such media with some
reasonable adjustments. In the words of Robin Foster:
There are no exact parallels for the new digital intermediaries
identified here—most are not neutral “pipes” like ISPs, through
which all Internet content flows (although Twitter is close to this);
nor are they pure media companies like broadcasters or newspapers,
heavily involved in creative and editorial decisions. But they do
perform important roles in selecting and channelling information,
which implies a legitimate public interest in what they do.194

Paul Bernal even calls the supposed neutrality of gatekeepers
(Facebook among them) a “myth.”195 The selection of content is not a
neutral or value-neutral activity, and it reflects numerous interests of a
platform. This might not be a problem in and of itself, but it raises
concerns that users are not familiar with those interests and values.
Users cannot really know (or it would take extreme effort on their side
to find out) what else is really out there apart from the content they are
shown. As Klonick has highlighted, it is not a priority for social media
platforms at this time to ensure adequate opportunities for all to
participate in public discourse.196
194. ROBIN FOSTER, NEWS PLURALITY IN A DIGITAL WORLD 30 (2012).
195. Bernal, supra note 188, at 71‒101.
196. Klonick, supra note 71, at 1665.
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It seems that the architecture of platforms, the editorial decisions
governing their general operations and their underlying values are
more important than any individual decision made by a platform in
response to a notice concerning a given piece of content, as those factors
determine the overall functioning of the platform and have an impact
on the ability of all the users to access information.197 The provision of a
personalized service to users could act to suppress their overall picture
of news and information on public affairs. This means that the number
of news reports produced by traditional media can be drastically
reduced at the whim of Zuckerberg198 which is also announced by the
platform from time to time.199 When a bill unfavourable to Facebook
was published in early 2021, it banned Australian news providers and
media companies overnight from posting new content and other users
from sharing content from such companies.200 The draft required
platforms to pay content producers if their content is made available by
the platform. After a few weeks of discussion, an agreement was
reached, after which the content of these providers became accessible
again.201 According to documents leaked by a whistleblower in
September 2021, Facebook shielded millions of VIP users from standard
moderation protocols, by using a program that whitelisted millions of
VIP users from the company’s standard content moderation practices,
despite the company’s insistence that all rules apply equally to all
users.202 According to the leaked documents, Facebook changed content
policies for several weeks surrounding the 2020 U.S. elections, when the

197. Frank Fagan, Systemic Social Media Regulation, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 393
(2018).
198. Emily Bell, Why Facebook’s News Feed Changes are Bad News for Democracy,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
21,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/mediablog/2018/jan/21/why-facebook-news-feed-changes-bad-news-democracy.
199. Kevin Roose & Mike Isaac, Facebook Dials Down the Politics for Users, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/technology/facebookreduces-politics-feeds.html.
200. Archie Bland, Facebook Over-Enforced Australia News Ban, Admits Nick Clegg,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
24,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/24/facebook-over-enforced-australianews-ban-admits-nick-clegg.
201. Kari Paul, What Facebook’s Australia News Ban could Mean for its Future in the
US,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
27,
2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/27/facebook-australia-news-ban-uslegislation.
202. Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Says Its Rules Apply to All. Company Documents Reveal a
Secret Elite That’s Exempt, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 13, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-files-xcheck-zuckerberg-elite-rules11631541353?mod=djemalertNEWS.
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company gave lower priority to political content on its news feed, but
after the election the platform soon went back to algorithms that valued
engagement over all else, realizing that “if they change the algorithm to
be safer, people will spend less time on the site, they’ll click on less ads,
and [Facebook] will make less money.”203
The tools available to platforms for influencing the public are
downright frightening, and given that, for many users, social media
platforms have become the primary or often the only source of news,
restricting public interest content in no way improves the quality of
democratic decision-making.
Facebook’s reasons for changing how algorithms present (or hide)
certain types of content are predominantly financial, not a matter of
principle. Facebook is in fact in competition with such media, even if it
does not produce any content, and the company seeks to maximize its
revenues from those media in return for presenting their content to its
users. The provision of personalized services and news services in
particular can reduce the diversity and selection of news that individual
users come across when using the platform. In the era of traditional
media, it was inevitable for readers to see content they did not
specifically look for or agree with, but the comfort of personalization
eliminates this unpleasantness. The personalization of news goes
against the very concept of the marketplace of ideas, as users do not
meet opinions that contradict their own personal views and opinions
unless they specifically look for them.204
A platform may also interfere with its news feed in line with its
political views and social objectives, and this very capacity poses a
direct threat to the public sphere and the democratic expression of
opinions. The existence of this phenomenon was demonstrated by a
scandal in 2016 when tech-blog Gizmodo reported allegations from
Facebook staff members that the company suppressed conservative
topics and sources deliberately and in a systemic manner. The platform
had claimed previously that the content of Trending Topics (a service
listing topics that are most actively discussed by other users of the
platform, also known as “hot topics”) was compiled by algorithms
exclusively on the basis of actual user activity and without any direct
human intervention. However, former employees of the company
203. Kari Paul & Dan Milmo, Facebook Putting Profit Before Public Good, Says
Whistleblower
Frances
Haugen,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
3,
2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/oct/03/former-facebook-employee-franceshaugen-identifies-herself-as-whistleblower.
204. Sarah Eskens, Natali Helberger & Judith Moeller, Challenged by News
Personalisation: Five Perspectives on the Right to Receive Information, 17 J. MEDIA L. 259,
281 (2017).
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reported that they had to select the topics on the basis of political
considerations.
According to reports, links to certain conservative websites were not
allowed in the Trending Topics section, even if they were among the
most frequently shared content on the platform.205 The case showed
clearly that the selection of pieces of news that were to be featured and
widely discussed on Facebook was not influenced by neutral algorithms
but human editors (known as “news curators”).206 In essence, the
scandal resulted in the defeat of an important taboo and a paradigm
shift regarding the role of the platform. Facebook became an actual
news editor and, as such, similar to traditional media.207 Even though
Trending Topics was phased out by the platform eventually, it seems
hard not to believe that similar news editing practices might be used by
other services of the platform or outside the U.S. 208 If Facebook is
considered a news editor, it might just be reasonable to extend the
scope of legal provisions applicable to the news editors of the legacy
media to social media platforms.
The Cambridge Analytica scandal became a global issue. The data
analytics firm worked with Trump’s election team and for the Brexit
campaign and harvested the personal data of up to eighty-seven million
Facebook users (U.S. voters), in the platform’s biggest known data
breach so far. Cambridge Analytica used these data to build a software
program to predict and influence choices at the ballot box. The profiling

205. Philip Bump, Did Facebook Bury Conservative News? Ex-Staffers Say Yes, THE
WASHINGTON POST (May 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/05/09/former-facebook-staff-say-conservative-news-was-buried-raisingquestions-about-its-political-influence/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8338634b2401;
Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative News,
GIZMODO (May 9, 2016), https://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinelysuppressed-conser-1775461006.
206. Sam Thielman, Facebook News Selection is in Hands of Editors Not Algorithms,
Documents
Show,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
12,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/12/facebook-trending-news-leakeddocuments-editor-guidelines.
207. Natali Helberger & Damian Trilling, Facebook is a News Editor: The Real Issues
to be Concerned About, LSE MEDIA POLICY PROJECT (May 26, 2016),
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/05/26/facebook-is-a-news-editor-the-realissues-to-be-concerned-about.
208. Chris Morris, Facebook Kills “Trending” Topics, Will Test “Breaking News” Label,
FORTUNE (Jun. 1, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/06/01/facebook-kills-trending-newstopics.
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of U.S. individuals was aimed at targeting them with personalized
political advertisements, thereby influencing several elections.209
In the last weeks of the 2020 presidential campaign, the New York
Post published a story that alleged that while Joe Biden (the
then-future President) was Vice President of the U.S., he had engaged
in corrupt activities relating to the employment of his son Hunter Biden
by the Ukrainian gas company Burisma. The story’s credibility is still
disputed. However, according to established facts, Hunter Biden was
indeed hired by Burisma, and he received large sums of money from the
company, but corruption on the part of the then Vice President remains
unproven.210 After the publication of the story on the New York Post’s
website, Twitter and Facebook implemented measures to prevent the
sharing of the article. Later on, they explained their decision as forming
part of their ongoing struggle against fake news.211 In this instance, the
“suppression is a bigger scandal than the actual story.”212
Commentators accused the platforms of censorship, partisanship,
double standards, and the intention to influence the presidential
elections.213
The activities of gatekeepers raise questions concerning both their
possible direct interference with the freedom of speech and also the
issue of media (or, in the case of social media platforms, content)
pluralism or diversity, which is one of the main objectives of media
regulation in Europe. The regulatory regimes aim to increase the
diversity of published content and opinions concerning public matters
regarding the television and radio markets. To this end, provisions
pertaining to content and structural restrictions seeking to prevent the
concentration of ownership may also be adopted to a limited extent, and
the public service media can also work to expand the media offering.
Given the market influence of gatekeepers, it seems reasonable to raise
209. Alvin Chang, The Facebook and Cambridge Analytica Scandal, Explained with a
Simple
Diagram,
VOX
(Mar.
23,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/3/23/17151916/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-diagram.
210. Katie Robertson, New York Post Published Hunter Biden Report Amid Newsroom
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THE
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(Oct.
18,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/18/business/media/new-york-post-hunter-biden.html.
211. Kelvin Chan, Twitter CEO Says it was Wrong to Block Links to Biden Story, AP
NEWS (Oct. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/business-media-social-media-censorshipec529ef85c1e72cefe0ae9450e118b9c.
212. Matt Taibbi, With the Hunter Biden Expose, Suppression Is a Bigger Scandal
Than the Actual Story, TK NEWS (Oct. 24, 2020), https://taibbi.substack.com/p/with-thehunter-biden-expose-suppression-136?fbclid=IwAR0Sbma_0gfwmaK95xsdb_11hDYF2Kb_jLV4VXeu5S3NJr2_PuQcRmbge8.
213. Glenn Greenwald, My Resignation from the Intercept, GREENWALD (Oct. 29, 2020),
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the issue of media pluralism, a matter that is quite common with
regard to television and radio services, and the possible adaptation of
known media regulatory solutions to the online environment. 214
Note the strange paradox here: in the beginning, the Internet was
heralded as the ultimate solution to the scarcity of content and
promised to render earlier forms of media regulations meaningless,
while we are now facing problems already all too well-known from the
media market, but on a much larger scale.
Back in 1996, Owen Fiss argued that freedom of speech had
traditionally been considered as a shield from interference by the state,
thereby protecting individual freedom. This doctrine fostered a media
ecosystem that benefited large media corporations, and gave them
powers over the public sphere, silencing individuals who did not possess
any opinion-shaping power or any opportunity to express themselves in
the public sphere. This was the irony of free speech.215 Moran Yemini
calls the new digital ecosystem of public communication the “new irony”
of free speech.216
Nevertheless, freedom of speech remains primarily a “negative right”
that protects the content of opinions against external sources of
interference, but it does not guarantee the right to use platforms that
facilitate the effective exercise of this freedom. Similar to traditional
press and media regulations, a recognized right to reach an audience
does not exist in the context of the Internet either.217
2. The Media Regulation Toolbox
If social media platforms were primarily to be seen by regulators as
media services, the application of legacy media obligations would
naturally arise. However, the media regulation approaches common in
Europe cannot be applied without addressing the content diversity
issue posed by social media platforms. Even so, adopting some elements
of certain regulatory instruments, after suitable modification, adapting
them to the operational characteristics of the platforms, would not be
unthinkable. The following section reviews this set of media regulation
tools, including the difficulties that may arise in their application. Rules

214. Robin Mansell, The Public’s Interest in Intermediaries, 17 J. POL’Y. REGUL.
STRATEGY TELECOMM. INFO. MEDIA 8 (2015); Natali Helberger et. al., Regulating the New
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119 (2018).
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to increase supply diversity are organized around the idea of media
pluralism.
The regulation of television, radio, and on-demand audiovisual and
radio media services seek to remedy, through indirect means,
distortions in public communication caused by partisanship, the lack of
diversity, or the publication of false information. Generally speaking,
these tools try to accommodate as many different opinions as possible in
the debate on public affairs. In line with the theoretical requirements of
media pluralism, the entire media market should collectively cater for
the diversity of opinions and available content and establish a balance
between them.218 This requirement primarily imposes tasks on the state
in respect of the regulation of the media market, and in practice such
regulation mainly concerns traditional television and radio
broadcasting. However, since the market of social media platforms tend
to be monopolistic, overseeing the market by state agencies does not
seem to be helpful for maintaining and developing the public sphere.
Individual legal systems try to achieve the objective of media
pluralism primarily by controlling media concentration. Such rules seek
to prevent, by restricting ownership, the emergence of media market
concentration.219 In recent years, the European Commission has
repeatedly attempted to take action against, for example, market
abuses by companies such as Google.220 In addition to the powerful
voices that even suggested breaking up these giants, there were also
worldwide doubts as to whether the restriction of concentration could
provide an appropriate response to the problems posed by the
platforms, and whether strong intervention in market conditions would
do more harm to publicity than it would prevent.221
Based on the right of reply, access to the content of a media service
provider is granted in response to content published previously by the
service provider. Article 28 of the AVMS Directive222 prescribes that
E.U. Member States should introduce national legal regulations with
regard to television broadcasting that ensure adequate legal remedies
for those whose personality rights have been infringed through false
statements. Such regulations are known Europe-wide and typically
218. See EWA KOMOREK, MEDIA PLURALISM AND EUROPEAN LAW (2012).
219. EDWIN C. BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP
MATTERS (2006).
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YALE L. J. F. 563 (2021).
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impose obligations on the printed and online press alike.223 It is
important to highlight that the function of the right of reply is twofold.
On the one hand, it serves the protection of the personality rights (the
reputation or honor) of the person attacked. On the other hand, it
serves the right of the public to appropriate, truthful information.
The compatibility of the right of reply and Article 10 of the
Convention has been confirmed in several decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights.224 In Melnychuk v. Ukraine,225 the court
established that the right of reply constituted a part of the freedom of
speech of the applicant. Thus, rather than limiting the freedom of the
press of the publisher of the newspaper carrying the injurious content,
the opposite is true. The right is an instrument that enables the
complainant to effectively exercise their freedom of speech in the forum
where the complainant has been attacked. In Kaperzynski v. Poland,226
the European Court of Human Rights held:
The Court is of the view that a legal obligation to publish a
rectification or a reply may be seen as a normal element of the legal
framework governing the exercise of the freedom of expression by the
print media . . . . Indeed, the Court has already held that the right of
reply, as an important element of freedom of expression, falls within
the scope of Article 10 of the Convention. This flows from the need
not only to be able to contest untruthful information, but also to
ensure a plurality of opinions, especially on matters of general
interest such as literary and political debate.227

The first major decision by the Supreme Court of the United States
concerning a right of reply law was Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal
Communications Commission.228 It examined the constitutionality of
the Federal Communications Commission’s fairness doctrine, which
required that some discussion of public issues must be presented on
broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair
coverage. It contained a specific right of reply element: if, during the
presentation of a controversial issue, an attack was made, “upon the
honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified
223. Kyu Ho Youm, The Right of Reply and Freedom of the Press: An International and
Comparative Perspective, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1017 (2008); András Koltay, The Right of
Reply in a European Comparative Perspective, HUNGARIAN J. OF LEGAL STUD.—ACTA
JURIDICA HUNGARICA 73 (2013).
224. Ediciones Tiempo S.A. v. Spain, no. 13010/87, decision of 12 July 1989.
225. Melnychuk v. Ukraine, no. 28743/03, decision of 5 July 2005.
226. Eur. Ct. H.R. Kaperzynski v. Poland, no. 43206/07, judgment of 3 April 2012.
227. Id. at para 66.
228. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

2022

THE PROTECTION OF FREEDOM

583

person or group,” the attacked person must be given an opportunity to
reply. The same obligation applied if a political candidate’s views were
endorsed or opposed, which entailed the broadcaster giving the
opposing candidate or the opponents of the endorsed candidate the
opportunity to respond. The Court unanimously upheld the regulations.
It came as a slight surprise in the light of Red Lion that, only five
years later, the Court—again unanimously—struck down a piece of
Florida legislation that required the printed press to give the right of
reply to candidates for political office who had been assailed over their
personal character or official record.229 The Court ruled in favour of the
autonomous press:
[T]he implementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of
access necessarily . . . brings about a confrontation with the express
provisions of the First Amendment . . . . Compelling editors or
publishers to publish that which “ʻreason’ tells them should not be
published” is what is at issue in this case. The Florida statute
operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation
forbidding [the newspaper] to publish specified matter . . . . [T]he
Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment
because of its intrusion into the function of editors.230

Many commentators celebrated the Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo decision as a victory for press freedom and blamed the Court
for the serious mistake it made in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Commission.231 They argued that a free media market,
even with its considerable failings, is always better than one that is
regulated by the state. Other authors celebrate Red Lion and hold that
Miami Herald was wrong. For them, ensuring that people are presented
with a wide range of views about public issues is necessary to make
democracy work, and this aim can justify state intervention.232
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In certain European states, the regulation promoting media
pluralism also includes the requirement for impartial news coverage, on
the basis of which public affairs need to be reported impartially in
programs providing information on them. Such regulation may apply to
television and radio broadcasters, and it has been implemented in
several states in Europe.233 Those who argue against maintaining this
rule point out that, since the former scarcity of information has been
eliminated, and hence, in this new media world, everyone can obtain
information from countless sources, the earlier regulatory models have
become redundant or, one might say, anachronistic. By contrast, as
Steven Barnett noted, for as long as television journalism can be
differentiated from Internet journalism, there is no reason to stop
having media-specific rules.234 Mike Feintuck argued that the earlier
assumption, suggesting that in a free and unrestricted media market a
diversity of opinions would automatically appear and hence impartiality
would arise, has proven unfounded.235 As Richard Sambrook put it, “[i]f
the words ‘impartiality’ and ‘objectivity’ have lost their meanings, we
need to reinvent them or find alternative norms to ground journalism
and help it serve its public purpose—providing people with the
information they need to be free and self-governing.”236
Safeguarding media pluralism can impose obligations not only on the
state and media service providers, the publishers of printed and online
press products, but also on those distributing television and radio
programs (cable and satellite broadcasters). Pursuant to the must carry
rules, distributors need to include the programs of certain broadcasters
in the services broadcast to audiences, which means that they need to
allocate a certain part of the distribution capacity to certain
broadcasters, typically public service or local broadcasters, in order to
safeguard media pluralism in the interest of the public.
The must carry restriction was also recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States as constitutional in the Turner Broadcasting

233. See, e.g., the German regulations (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, §§ 25–34); U.K.
regulation §§ 319(2)(c); 319(2)(d), 319(8); 320 of the Communications Act 2003; and § 5 of
the Broadcasting Code; see also the recent decision of the ECtHR, Associazione Politica
Nazionale Lista Marco Pannella v. Italy, no. 66984/14, judgment of 31 August 2021.
234. Steven Barnett, Imposition or Empowerment? Freedom of Speech, Broadcasting
and Impartiality, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE MEDIA 58 (Merris Amos, Jackie
Harrison and Lorna Woods eds., 2012).
235. Mike Feintuck, Impartiality in News Coverage: The Present and the Future,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE MEDIA 88 (Merris Amos, Jackie Harrison and Lorna
Woods eds., 2012).
236. RICHARD SAMBROOK, DELIVERING TRUST: IMPARTIALITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 39 (2012).
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System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission cases.237 Justice
Kennedy, drafting the reasoning in the first case, established that the
constitutional restriction of cable services is easier than that of
broadcasting, because the former is not expressly related to the
restriction on content. However, more in-depth analysis is required to
establish whether or not the legal restriction is really necessary and
justified. The second Turner decision answered this question in the
affirmative. Sunstein considered this decision of the Court to be a sort
of overture to the new, community-based interpretation of the First
Amendment, as a small majority of the board recognized that a strictly
content-neutral restriction of access to media is constitutional, as it is in
the public interest.238
In certain cases, media regulation may require media service
providers, as a condition of their entitlement to provide media services,
to publish information of public interest, to provide local news, and to
reserve a certain proportion of airtime for public service programs.239 In
addition, public service media providers are strong players in the media
market in European states, primarily operating by using public
financial resources.240
3. Applying the Principles of Media Regulation to Social
Media Platforms
The media regulation solutions described above would certainly not
work without any changes taking place in the world of social media.
These rules were adopted in the era of technological scarcity, and it
would not be possible to justify their strict application to today’s public
platforms, characterized by excessive abundance of content.241 However,
the considerations underlying these rules have not become void. The
European view maintains that it is not the principles of media
regulation that are in decline, but at most its methods in a public
sphere dominated by Internet communication and platforms. The
algorithms of the platforms may also draw attention to the existence of
different opinions and the platform can provide an opportunity for a
person whose reputation has been violated to respond to false factual
237. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
238. Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L. J. 1757,
1765–81 (1995).
239. See e.g., the U.K.’s Communications Act 2003, s. 287(2).
240. KAREN DONDERS, PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN EUROPE: LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2021).
241. See e.g., Mike Jayne, Fairness Doctrine 2.0: The Ever-Expanding Definition of
Neutrality Under the First Amendment, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. (2018) (with regard to
the fairness doctrine’s possible application to online platforms).
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statements. In principle, the platform may be required to present a
certain amount or proportion of news and information of public interest
to its users.
The kind of diversity that can be expected at all from social media
also differs from the requirements applicable to legacy media, in that it
does not concern the production or commissioning of diverse content but
would instead envisage the appropriate selection of already diverse user
content and make a sufficiently diverse flow of information accessible to
individual users. Natali Helberger, Kari Karppinen, and Lucia
D’Acunto call this exposure diversity,242 and consider it conceivable
that, if this is integrated in the operation of the platforms from the
outset (diversity by design), platforms can deliver on the need for
diversity.243
Even though the concept of “due impartiality in news coverage,” a
requirement under traditional media regulation, could serve as an
appropriate starting point for introducing a new regulatory scheme, a
legal system may not require social media platforms to operate with the
same degree of impartiality as a television or radio news program,
particularly because (i) a platform does not produce any content that
would be relevant in this context, and (ii) not even a platform is capable
of overseeing the entire body of content generated by its users.
Requiring a platform to attempt to present content in an entirely
impartial manner would mean that it is subject to the same obligations
as a television or radio editor, despite the above-mentioned
characteristics. The regulation of electronic program guides seems to be
a more appropriate analogy, as it requires service providers to present
certain important pieces of (public service media) content in a
distinctive manner. This obligation may be labelled by various names,
such as “findability,” “due prominence,” or even also as “exposure
diversity.”244
Encountering a wide variety of content, including some that the user
would not have deliberately sought, such as reactions to a false
statement of fact, or raising awareness of dissenting opinions, is good
for democratic publicity and contributes to informed opinion-making,
thus enhancing the quality of democratic decision-making and
counteracting the oft-cited “echo chamber” or “filter bubble” effect.
According to some theories, the Internet has a negative impact on

242. Natali Helberger et. al., Exposure Diversity as a Design Principle for
Recommender Systems, 21 INFO. COMMC’N. SOC’Y. 191 (2018).
243. Id. at 203–04.
244. Bart van der Sloot, Walking a Thin Line: The Regulation of EPGs, 3 JIPITEC 138
(2012).
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various social groups and their members. Cass Sunstein warned us of
the dangers of fragmentation as early as two decades ago.245 First,
every user can decide individually which content to read, view, or
follow. This might prompt users to prefer forums that reinforce and
resonate with their existing opinions, and which typically provide
positive feedback, without having to face others holding an opposing
opinion. Second, social media amplifies this phenomenon by delivering
a personalized news stream to each user, which consists of content
originating from friends with similar opinions and media outlets
preferred by the user. This is the Daily Me, a form of news source that
is always in agreement with the reader, thereby intensifying his or her
pre-existing liberal or conservative views and opinions.246 These
customized services create the “filter bubble effect,” that is, they trap
users in a circle of content that is identical to or consistent with their
own views and mostly hide other content from them.247 On the other
hand, traditional media compile content on their own without any input
from the reader or viewer, making it inevitable that members of the
audience will be confronted with various points of view. The benefits of
this approach include the emergence of a more complex worldview and
the reinforcement of critical thinking.248 In contrast, the dominance of
social media and search engines deepens the gap between individuals
with conflicting opinions, thereby weakening social cohesion and
strengthening extremism (polarization).249 Other researchers seek to
disprove Sunstein’s theory and argue that “omnivore” Internet users
are the rule, while calling for the previous world of media to be
presented in a more critical manner.250
Transparency of prioritization by platforms, namely ensuring that
the users concerned and the public bodies supervising the operation are
aware of what is happening on the platform, can be required in
principle (this does not necessarily mean full transparency of the
operation of algorithms in a technological sense, which is difficult or
even impossible to implement). Some European countries have already
245. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0
(2007).
246. A term coined by Nicholas Negroponte and also used by Sunstein, see Cass R.
Sunstein, ch 1, in #REPUBLIC. DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017).
247. ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU
(2012) (in the context of search engines).
248. Sunstein, supra note 239, at 140–48.
249. Id. at ch. 3.
250. TIM WU, MASTER SWITCH 214–15 (2010); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro,
Ideological Segregation Online and Offline (Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 10-19,
2010).
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started reflecting on how to require platforms to offer diverse content
and to prevent bias in publicity.251 Of course, state intervention is not
without risk and may lead to state censorship in the name of acting
against censorship of platforms, which regulatory suggestions must
keep in mind.
The regulation of “recommender systems” is also on the E.U.’s
agenda. The Digital Services Act proposes making their operation more
transparent and increasing the importance of user preferences:
Article 29, Recommender Systems
1. Very large online platforms that use recommender systems shall
set out in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily
comprehensible manner, the main parameters used in their
recommender systems, as well as any options for the recipients of the
service to modify or influence those main parameters that they may
have made available, including at least one option which is not based
on profiling, within the meaning of Article 4 (4) of Regulation (EU)
2016/679.
2. Where several options are available pursuant to paragraph 1, very
large online platforms shall provide an easily accessible functionality
on their online interface allowing the recipient of the service to select
and to modify at any time their preferred option for each of the
recommender systems that determines the relative order of
information presented to them.

The latest legislation on this area in Germany aims to help achieve
one of the main objectives of media regulation affecting platforms.252
The regulation obliges social media platforms, video sharing platforms,
and search engines to be non-discriminatory in terms of content and to
prioritize public service content, while not restricting user
preferences.253 These provisions aim to promote the diversity of content
on platforms.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The impact of social media platforms on freedom of speech is
extremely wide-ranging. Social and legacy media are similar in terms of
editorial activity, but there are also significant differences between
them. Accordingly, media regulation cannot be applied to platforms
without any change. The approach used in Europe, according to which,
in certain cases, the lawfulness of content must be decided by platforms,
raises concerns in terms of freedom of speech. At the same time, it is
also clear that the judicial system or a public authority would not be
able to handle the workload associated with the operation of the
platforms, so the notice-and-takedown system remains the basis for the
liability of the platforms as a kind of emergency measure.
The contract between a platform and its users provides an
opportunity to take the interests of users regarding freedom of speech
more into account than is currently the case. State regulation can also
help in this regard. The platforms themselves are private actors, which
claim a right to protect their own freedom of speech, so this must be
taken into account in any regulatory attempts.
The regulations and proposals that have been made so far in
European states primarily encourage stronger action against harmful,
dangerous content and, accordingly, are less concerned with the
protection of freedom of speech. The proposed regulation of the
European Union (the Digital Services Act) and some ideas at national
level also aim to strengthen users’ freedom of speech, mainly through
the introduction of appropriate procedural guarantees restricting the
scope of private regulation and the creation of an independent forum for
redress.
Another aspect of editing by platforms, the regulation of
prioritization between content, is currently on the agenda but has been
accorded less emphasis. The diversity of content that is actually
available to users and easy access to public interest content is a
fundamental concern of democratic publicity. The media regulation
solutions already widely used in Europe may inspire the regulation of
platforms, and the principles and values underlying regulation will not
melt into thin air as a result of technological progress.

